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L Introduction
Since the late 1980s, there has been a vigorous debate among both
judges and academics about the appropriateness of a textualist approach to
statutory interpretation and of the use of legislative history.1 Justices Scalia

and Thomas, the leading proponents of textualism on the Supreme Court,
have frequently written or joined decisions that anger environmental advocacy groups. In City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund,3 however, their textualist approach to statutory interpretation resulted in a
victory for the Environmental Defense Fund.
1. See infra notes 12-43 and accompanying text.
2. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992)
(Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J.) (finding that South Carolina's Beachfront Management
Act, which prohibited building of any structure in designated "coastal zone," constituted per
se taking of property by depriving owner of all economically viable use of land); Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 571-73 (1992) (plurality opinion) (Scalia, J., writing
plurality opinion and joined by Thomas, J.) (denying standing to challenge Department of
Interior action under citizen suit provision of Endangered Species Act without showing that
agency's action affected "concrete interest" of plaintiffs); Citizens Against Burlington, Inc.
v. Busey, 938 F.2d 190, 206 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Thomas, J.) (finding that Federal Aviation
Administration could limit discussion of alternatives in environmental impact statement to
those proposed by private applicant); Richard J. Lazarus & Claudia M. Newman, City of
Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund: Searchingfor Plain Meaning in Unambiguous
Ambiguity, 4 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 2 n.3 (1995) (citing Justice Scalia's allegedly antienvironmentalist decisions); infra notes 128-29, 181-85, and accompanying text.
3. 511 U.S. 328 (1994).
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As a result, Professor Lazarus, who argued the City of Chicago case
before the Supreme Court on behalf of the Environmental Defense Fund, 4
and Ms. Newman, who worked with Lazarus on the case,5 contend that,
contrary to the expectations of environmentalists who believe that most
judges associated with textualism are hostile to environmentalism, a plain
meaning approach to statutory construction is more likely to result in
victories for environmentalists because environmental statutes on their face
usually contain broad aspirational language and no exceptions.' Most often,
it is industry rather than environmental groups that seek exceptions from a
statute's text by trying to find flexibility in its legislative history, "the
content of which tends to be the product of hard-fought and lengthy debate
among committee staff members and interest groups. 7 Professor Lazarus
and Ms. Newman concede that in some cases a statute's legislative history
is more favorable to environmental plaintiffs than its text, but they conclude
that a textualist approach to statutory construction "is likely to inure frequently (but not exclusively) to the benefit of environmental plaintiffs. "8
This Article provides both anecdotal evidence and a more theoretical
argument for why textualist statutory interpretation is not the best approach
to address environmental. issues. Part IV provides some counterexamples
that show it is not clear that a textualist approach will lead to more victories
for environmental plaintiffs. More importantly, textualism does not provide
the best method to resolve the frequent conflict in environmental statutes
between protecting the public health and limiting the cost of regulation,
especially because textualists tend to slight the balance struck by the environmental agency. Judges applying a textualist approach often read environmental statutes narrowly to limit the authority of environmental agencies. Moreover, the textualist method is sufficiently indeterminate that a
otextualist judge could have decided even the City of Chicago case either for
or against environmental advocacy groups. Even if textualist statutory
interpretation resulted in more victories for environmental advocacy groups,
the tendency of textualists to place so little value on the interpretations of
the environmental agencies that have greater practical experience with the

4. See Lazarus & Newman, supra note 2, at 1 n.a.
5. Id.
6. See id. at 23. See generally James A. Henderson, Jr. & Richard N. Pearson,

Implementing FederalEnvironmental Policies: The Limits of Aspirational Commands, 78
COLUM. L. REv. 1429 (1978) (discussing frequent use of aspirational language in environ-

mental statutes and problems often caused by such language).
7.

Lazarus & Newman, supra note 2, at 23.

8. Id.
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underlying issues raises serious questions about whether textualism is the
best way to decide environmental policies.
In addition, Professor Lazarus and Ms. Newman suggest that courts
should ignore a statute's legislative history because such material is more
likely to contain pro-industry provisions than the text. 9 Even assuming they
are right, Part V demonstrates that interpreters ought to consider a statute's
legislative history because such material is often essential in understanding
Congress's intent in enacting a bill.
Part VI explains that a fundamental problem with textualism is that it
downplays the role of administrative agencies in interpreting complex
regulatory statutes. Thus, textualist judges too often ignore the spiritof the
Supreme Court's decision, Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc.,1° which emphasized that agencies generally are more
competent at interpreting complex regulatory statutes than are generalist
Article III judges, and as a result, these textualists fail to give sufficient
deference to the expertise of environmental agencies. Even if the LazarusNewman thesis that environmentalist groups would win more often if courts
consistently employed a textualist approach is correct, it is better policy to
allow environmental agencies to consider both Congress's intent in adopting
the statute and the agency's assessment of the costs and benefits of various
interpretations. Sometimes society is better off if an agency ignores a text's
apparent meaning and allows industry a cost-saving exemption or exception
from the statute's literal requirements."1
Part II discusses the textualist approach to statutory interpretation and
its critics. Part III examines the impact of textualism on judicial application
of the Chevron doctrine. Part IV provides some anecdotal evidence for
why textualism will not always lead to victories for environmentalists and
makes the broader argument that textualist judges often disregard the
delicate balance struck by agencies between cost and safety. Part IV.A
shows that Congress often limits broad aspirational language in an environmental statute with more restrictive terms in its implementing provisions
and maintains that agencies are more adept at balancing conflicting textual
language than textualist judges. Part IV.B demonstrates how courts can use
a textualist approach to limit the authority of environmental agencies. Part
IV.C illustrates why the textualist method is sufficiently indeterminate that
a textualist judge can decide many cases either for or against environmental
advocacy groups. Part V discusses why interpreters should consider a
9. Id.
10. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
11. See"infra text accompanying note 289.
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statute's legislative history. Part VI explains why a narrow textualist
approach to statutory interpretation is inconsistent with the essence of the
Chevron doctrine and proposes that courts should give considerable weight
to an environmental agency's expertise in interpreting complex environmen-

tal statutes.
I. The Impact of Textualist Statutory Interpretation
It is important to understand the major theories of statutory interpreta-

tion before examining how these different approaches can affect how courts
or agencies interpret environmental statutes.

There are three major or

"foundationalist" theories of statutory interpretation: (1) intentionalism,
(2) purposivism, and (3) textualism. 12 Intentionalists traditionally examine
both a statute's text and legislative history to determine the original intent
of the enacting legislature.' 3 By contrast, purposivists go beyond the
legislature's original intent to estimate the statute's spirit or purpose because

either it may be difficult to determine the statute's original intent or a court
must apply a statute to circumstances that the enacting legislature did not
foresee.' 4 If there are ambiguities in a statute, many purposivists try to
12. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretationas
PracticalReasoning, 42 STAN. L. REv. 321, 324-25 (1990) (arguing that three major
theories of statutory interpretation are "foundationalist" because "each seeks an objective
ground ('foundation') that will reliably guide the interpretations of all statutes in all situations"); Blake A. Watson, Liberal Construction of CERCLA Under the Remedial Purpose
Canon: Have the Lower Courts Taken a Good Thing Too Far?,20 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv.
199, 211 nA6 (1996) (citing numerous articles on statutory construction); see also WILLIAM
N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 13-47 (1994) (discussing
weaknesses of intentionalism, purposivism, and textualism).
13. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 12, at 14-25 (describing and criticizing intentionalism);
John P. Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 233, 298-99
(1990); Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 12, at 327; Watson, supra note 12, at 211-12; see
also Dwyer, supra, at 298 n.267 (listing intentionalist scholars). Dwyer lists the following
as examples of articles by leading intentionalists: Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey,
Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 423, 424 (1988) (stating that "[i]n our
view, public choice theory is consistent with a flexible, pragmatic approach to statutory
construction, in which legislative intent plays an important role"); Richard A. Posner, The
Jurisprudenceof Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REV. 827 (1988); Kenneth W. Starr, Of Forests
and Trees: Structuralism in the Interpretationof Statutes, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 703
(1988).
14. See ESKRIDGE, supranote 12, at 25-34 (describing and criticizing purposivism);
Watson, supra note 12, at 212, 214-15; see also HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS,
THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING & APPLICATION OF LAW 1378
(William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (discussing classic formulation
of purposivist approach to statutory interpretation). For example, the Massachusetts
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construe the statute in light of the assumption that the legislature 15
was acting

for the public good rather than for some narrow interest group.
More recently, some scholars have proposed to go beyond intentionalism or purposivism. Some proponents of "dynamic" statutory interpretation
urge judges to reformulate statutes, especially those concerned with civil
rights, in light of "public values." 6 Other scholars have proposed various
modified versions of intentionalism or purposivism that emphasize the need
for statutory interpreters to apply a "practical reason" that appropriately fits
general or ambiguous language to specific contexts 17 or takes into account
"how statutory interpretation will improve or impair the performance of
governmental institutions. "18
Justice Holmes, an early advocate of a textualist approach to statutory
interpretation, argued that- courts should be concerned only with what
Supreme Judicial Court's Chief Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. concluded that a statute
requiring "written votes" allowed the use of voting machines which used no paper at all
because the general purpose of the statute was to prevent oral or hand voting. See In re
House Bill No. 1291, 60 N.E. 129, 130 (Mass. 1901); RIcHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS
OF JURISPRUDENCE 267 (1990).
15. See HART & SACKS, supra note 14, at 1378 (noting how "reasonable [legislators]
pursu[e] reasonable purposes reasonably"); Philip P. Frickey, MarshallingPast and Present:
Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and Interpretationin Federal Indian Law, 107 HARv. L.
REV. 381, 407 (1993); Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-RegardingLegislation Through
Statutory Interpretation:An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 223, 250-56 (1986)
(arguing that courts in interpreting statutes should not enforce "hidden-implicit" bargains
favoring special interest groups, but rather should treat statutes as having public meaning);
Watson, supra note 12, at 212, 215. But see POSNER, supra note 14, at 276-78 (arguing
that it is difficult for courts to know whether legislature's purpose in enacting statute was
to serve public interest or to reach compromise among interest groups).
16. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 12, at 148-51; Dwyer, supra note 13, at 299 n.273.
See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation,137 U.
PA. L. REV. 1007 (1989).
17. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 12, at 322 n.3 (explaining that "[b]y 'practical
reason,' we mean an approach that eschews objectivist theories in favor of a mixture of
inductive and deductive reasoning (similar to the practice of the common law), seeking
contextual justification for the best legal answer among the potential alternatives"); Farber
& Frickey, supra note 13, at 469 (proposing "public choice theory" as practical reasoning
approach to understanding legislative intent that would allow judges "as many tools as
possible to help them in the difficult task of applying statutes"). See generally Daniel A.
Farber, The Inevitability of PracticalReason: Statutes, Formalism, and the Rule of Law, 45
VAND. L. REv. 533 (1992) (criticizing formalist approaches to statutory interpretation,
including textualism, and arguing in favor of practical reason or Llewellyn's situation sense
that examines problem of statutory interpretation in light of statutory context or purpose).
18. Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARv. L. REv.
405, 466 (1989); see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REvOLUTION: RECONCEIVING
THE REGULATORY STATE 113-17 (1990).
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Congress said and not what it meant.19 Since the late 1980s, Justices
Scalia,' Thomas,2 1 and to a lesser extent, Kennedy ' have emphasized a
"new textualist" approach to statutory interpretation.' Textualists generally

oppose both intentionalist and purposivist theories of statutory construction
because intentionalists and purposivists give the judiciary too great a role

in deciding the meaning of a statute. 24 Instead, textualists argue that a
statute's text alone provides the best evidence of the enacting legislature's
original intent.' Textualists commonly oppose the use of extrinsic sources,
such as legislative history, when judges interpret statutory text. 6 Rather,

19. See OIvRm WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 41, 44 (Mark DeWolfe
Howe ed., 1963); Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation,12 HARv.
L. REV. 417, 419 (1899). On occasion, however, Justice Holmes went beyond his textualist
theory to look at a statute's purpose. See, e.g., In re House Bill No. 1291, 60 N.E. 129,
130 (Mass. 1901) (finding that statute's requirement of "written votes" allowed use of voting
machines which used no paper at all because general purpose of statute was to prevent oral
or hand voting); POSNER, supra note 14, at 267.
20. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonesca, 480 U.S. 421, 452 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(advocating textualist approach to statutory interpretation).
21. See infra notes 128-29 and' accompanying text.
22. See Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 472-78 (1989)
(Kennedy, J., concurring). Although he was initially Justice Scalia's closest ally on the
Court, in recent years Justice Kennedy has been willing on some occasions to join opinions

relying upon legislative history. See, e.g., Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 510
U.S. 601, 610 n.4 (1991); Farber, supra note 17, at 546 n.76.
23. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 12, at 120 (contrasting "Kennedy's lenient textualism"
with "Scalia's dogmatic textualism"); id. at 226-34 (discussing and criticizing Scalia's "new
textualism"); Thomas W. Merrill, JudicialDeference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J.
969, 990-91 (1992) [hereinafter Merrill, Deference]; Thomas W. Merrill, Essay, Textualism
and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U.L.Q. 351, 351 (1994) [hereinafter
Merrill, Textualism] (concluding that Justice Thomas appears to share same views about
textualist interpretation as Justice Scalia). See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New
Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990) (describing Justice Scalia's approach to statutory
interpretation as "new textualism").
24. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule ofLaw as a Law ofRules, 56 U. Cm. L. REv. 1175,
1176 (1989). But see ESKRIDGE, supra note 12, at 232-33 (criticizing Scalia's argument that
textualism imposes more reliable restraints on judicial discretion).
25. See SUNsTEI,

supra note 18, at 113 (describing textualist view that "the statutory

language is the only legitimate basis for interpretation"); id. at 113-17 (criticizing textualist
statutory interpretation); see also ESKRIDGE, supra note 12, at 34-47, 232-33 & passim
(describing and criticizing textualism); Dwyer, supra note 13, at 298-99; Eskridge &
Frickey, supra note 12, at 327; Watson, supra note 12, at 212-13.
26. Justice Scalia believes that the constitutionally mandated role of the federal courts
is to interpret the actual statutory text approved by both chambers of Congress and presented
to the President and, therefore, that courts should not look at legislative history written
by committees or individual members of Congress. See, e.g., West Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc.
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textualists argue that judges should focus on the statutory text itself, which
they should read in light of the statute's structure, the canons of statutory

construction, administrative norms underlying the statute's implementation,
comparisons with the accepted interpretations of comparable statutory
provisions, and the dictionary meanings most congruous with ordinary
English usage and applicable law.'

Many textualists believe that if a

statute's text has a plain meaning, it is unnecessary or improper for judges
to examine either its legislative history or the legislature's implicit purposes

in enacting the measure.'
Justice Scalia and other new textualists often recognize that the meaning of words depends upon their context,2 9 but they seek whenever possible
v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 98-99 (1991); Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 192 (1988)
(Scalia, J., concurring); Muriel Morisey Spence, The Sleeping Giant: Textualism as Power
Struggle, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 585, 586 (1994); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and
the Interpretationof Statutes: Toward a Fact-FindingModel of Statutory Interpretation,
76 VA. L. REV. 1295, 1300-01 (1990) (discussing textualist argument that Presentment
Clause of Constitution requires judges to look at statutory text only); cf. INS v. Chadha,
462 U.S. 919, 925-32 (1983) (finding one-house legislative veto violates requirements
of bicameralism and presentment set forth in Article 1). But see ESKRMGE, supra note
12, at 230-32 (criticizing Scalia's bicameralism and presentment arguments); Arthur Stock,
Note, Justice Scalia's Use of Sources in Statutory and ConstitutionalInterpretation:How
Congress Always Loses, 1990 DuKE L.J. 160, 190-92 (criticizing Justice Scalia for not
considering legislative history). Although Justice Scalia's academic writings consistently
take the position that it is improper for judges to consider legislative history, at times his
judicial opinions have been willing to consider the intent of Congress in enacting a text. See
Carlos E. Gonzalez, ReinterpretingStatutory Interpretation,74 N.C. L. REV. 585, 604 n.66
(1996).
27. See Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (arguing that judges should glean statutory meaning from interpretation
"(1) most in accord with context and ordinary usage.., and (2) most compatible with the
surrounding body of law into which the provision must be integrated"); Spence, supra note
26, at 587.
28. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonesca, 480 U.S. 421, 452-53 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(arguing that if statutory text has "plain meaning" it is unnecessary to examine statute's
legislative history); United States v. Missouri Pacific R.R. Co., 278 U.S. 269, 278 (1929)
(providing classic statement of plain meaning rule); Bradley C. Karkkainen, "PlainMeaning": Justice Scalia's Jurisprudenceof Strict Statutory Construction, 17 HARv. J.L. & PuB.
POL'Y 401, 433-39 (1994) (arguing that Justice Scalia frequently uses plain meaning rule
to exclude use of legislative history); Watson, supra note 12, at 213 n.53 (same). But see
United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543-44 (1940) (stating that
courts may consult extrinsic materials such as legislative history even if statute's text has
clear meaning after "superficial examination").
29. See Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 241 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(stating that "fundamental principle of statutory construction (and, indeed, of language itself)
is that the meaning of a word cannot be determined in isolation, but must be drawn from
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to use canons of construction or other interpretive principles to provide
a fixed, "objective" meaning. 3 Although Scalia recognizes that Congress does not always write clear statutes, he contends that a textualist
approach to statutory construction, including the adoption of clear interpretive rules, will lead Congress to be more diligent and precise in drafting

statutes.31 Proponents of a plain meaning canon argue that Congress should

write a statute so that the average English speaker could understand its
32

meaning.
Textualists are usually less policy oriented than most proponents of
purposivism, modified intentionalism, or dynamic statutory interpretation.
If the text requires unpalatable results, a judge should normally enforce the
textual commands and leave it to Congress to fix any mistakes.3 3 Some

textualists might refuse to enforce a text's commands if doing so would
produce absurd results,' but they would be less likely to substitute alterna-

tive language for flawed statutory language because only Congress may
enact corrective legislation.35
Even critics of textualism acknowledge "that the statutory text is the
most authoritative interpretive criterion."36 To some extent, the revival of
the context in which, it is used"); Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in
Statutory Interpretation,17 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 61, 61 (1994); Merrill, Textualism,
supra note 23, at 352.
30. See Karkkainen, supra note 28, at 403-04, 428-30, 445-49 (discussing and
criticizing Justice Scalia's use of grammatical and structural canons to resolve apparent
ambiguities in statutory language); Merrill, Textualism, supra note 23, at 352 (explaining
that new textualists seek objective method to determine how ordinary reader of statute would
have understood statute's words at time of enactment).
31. See Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 556 (1989) (Scalia, J.). But see
ESKRIDGE, supra note 12, at 230-32 (criticizing Scalia's "democracy enhancing" argument).
32. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Statutory Constructionand the CoordinatingFunction of PlainMeaning, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 231, 250 (stating that plain meaning approach
enables Schauer to "converse with an English speaker with whom I have nothing in common
but our shared language").
33. See Carolyn McNiven, Comment, Using Severability Clauses to Solve the Attainment Dilemma in Environmental Statutes, 80 CAL. L. REv. 1255, 1302 (1992).
34. See K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 324 n.2 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Wlt is a venerable principle that a law will not
be interpreted to produce absurd results.").
35. See McNiven, supra note 33, at 1302. But see ESKRIDGE, supra note 12, at 134
("[B]y allowing an 'absurd result' exception to his dogmatic textualism, Scalia allowed for
just as much indeterminacy, and just as much room for judicial play, as he accused Brennan
of creating with his context-dependent approach to statutory meaning.").
36. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 12, at 354; see also Frickey, supra note 15, at 408
n. 119 (observing that while many judges are not textualists, all judges are "presumptive
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textualism during the 1980s was a healthy reaction to the misuse of legislative history by many judges. 37 Nevertheless, a majority of the Supreme
Court has remained open to nontextualist interpretation.3 S

Numerous commentators have attacked the textualist approach to statutory construction and argued that judges should examine extrinsic sources,

such as legislative history, as a means to reconstruct congressional intent in

enacting a statutory provision, especially if the textual terms are ambiguous. 39
In many cases, statutes do not have a single meaning based on dictionary
definitions or ordinary English usage. 4' In addition, changes in social circumstances may make it impractical or unwise to implement a statute pretextualists" who "follow relatively clear statutory language absent some strong reason to
deviate from it"); Watson, supra note 12, at 243 n.191.
37. See ACLU v. FCC, 823 F.2d 1554, 1583 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Starr, J., dissenting)
("We in the judiciary have become shamelessly profligate and unthinking in our use of
legislative history ....); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court's New Hypertextualism: An Invitation to Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 COLUM.
L. REv. 749, 751 (1995) (arguing that revival of textualism during 1980s was to some extent
healthy development counteracting improper use of legislative history); Patricia M. Wald,
Some Observationson the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68
IOWA L. REV. 195, 197, 214 (1983) (discussing ability of judges to use selective portions
of legislative history). See generally Jorge L. Carro & Andrew R. Brann, Use of Legislative
Histories by the United States Supreme Court:A StatisticalAnalysis, 9 J. LEGIS. 282 (1982)
(presenting statistical study showing Supreme Court increasingly used legislative history
from 1938 to 1979 and that increase in usage was especially rapid after 1970).
38. See, e.g., West Va. Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 102 (1991)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that "the Court uses the implements of literalism to
wound, rather than to minister to, congressional intent"); id. at 112-16 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that Congress is more likely to override textualist interpretations of
statutes and that majority's textualist interpretation is less consistent with Congress's intent
than dissent's less verbatim reading); see also Karkkainen, supra note 28, at 401 ("Only
Justices Anthony Kennedy and Clarence Thomas can be called adherents of Justice Scalia's
plain meaning approach.").
39. See Abner J. Mikva, A Reply to Judge Starr's Observations, 1987 DUKE L.J. 380,
386; Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Construing
Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 277,
309 (1990).
40. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 12, at 38-47 (criticizing textualist approaches to
statutory interpretation on grounds that in difficult cases there are always textual ambiguities); LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF JUDGES 113-17 (1993) (showing how

ineptly judges use statutory language to define meaning of statute and criticizing Justice
Scalia in particular); Stephen F. Ross, The Limited Relevance of Plain Meaning, 73 WASH.
U. L.Q. 1057, 1064-65 (1995) (arguing that English language alone cannot supply definitive
meaning). See generally Clark D. Cunningham et al., Plain Meaning and Hard Cases, 103
YALE L.J. 1561 (1994) (arguing that words often have multiple meanings and therefore
attempts to define single plain language interpretation are flawed).
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cisely as Congress wrote it.41 Furthermore, although a textualist approach
is supposed to increase the fidelity of courts to congressional intent, textualist
statutory interpretation may actually decrease legislative power by reading
the plain language of a statute too narrowly in a way that thwarts the intent
of most members of Congress.4 2 Although Congress overrides only a small
number of judicial decisions each year, there is some empirical evidence to
support Justice Stevens's view that textualist decisions by the Supreme Court
are disproportionately rejected by Congress.43
X. Chevron and Textualism
Although most discussions of statutory interpretation focus on the role
of the judiciary, an executive agency is almost always the initial interpreter
of an environmental statute. Usually, the crucial question is whether a court
should accept the agency's interpretation. The Supreme Court's Chevron
decision emphasized judicial deference to agency interpretations. Textualists,
however, tend to be less deferential to agency interpretations, especially
those interpretations that broadly construe the authority of environmental
agencies to regulate private property.
A. The Chevron Decision
In 1984, the Supreme Court decided the landmark case of Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. NaturalResources Defense Council, Inc. ," which fundamentally changed the law regarding when a court should defer to an agency's
construction of a statute.4' During the beginning of the Reagan administra41. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 12, at 125-28 (discussing hypothetical involving
directive to "fetch five pounds of soup meat every Monday" and using hypothetical to

illustrate need to consider changed circumstances).
42. See, e.g., West Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 102 (1991)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that "the Court uses the implements of literalism to

wound, rather than to minister to, congressional intent"); id. at 112-16 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that Congress is more likely to override textualist interpretations of statutes
and that majority's textualist interpretation is less consistent with Congress's intent than
dissent's less verbatim reading); Michael Herz, Judicial Textualism Meets Congressional
Micromanagement:A PotentialCollision in Clean Air Act Interpretation,16 HARv. ENVTL.
L. REV. 175, 204 (1992); Spence, supra note 26, at 588 & passim; Stock, supra note 26.
43. See infra notes 222-26 and accompanying text.
44. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
45. See Robert Glicksman & Christopher H. Schroeder, EPA and the Courts: Twenty
Years of Law and Politics, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1991, at 249, 286-92
(arguing that although Court may not have intended to do so, Chevron revolutionized issue
of when courts defer to agencies); Merrill, Deference, supranote 23, at 975-76 (same);
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tion, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) reversed a policy adopted
during the Carter administration and issued a revised rule interpreting the
term "stationary source" in the Clean Air Act to allow operators of polluting
facilities to treat all emitting devices as if they were under a single
"bubble. 1v46The Supreme Court chastised the court of appeals for failing to
defer to the EPA's interpretation of the statute despite the fact that the EPA's
definition of stationary source arguably represented a "sharp break with prior
interpretations of the Act. "I4
Chevron established a two-part test for determining when courts should
defer to an agency's construction of a statute. First, a court must examine
"whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue." 48
If Congress has so spoken to the issue, then the court must effectuate that
intent regardless of the agency's interpretation.49 If the statute is ambiguous,
however, the court in the second level of analysis must defer to the agency's
interpretation if it is "permissible," or in other words, if it is reasonable.5"
The Supreme Court in Chevron concluded that courts ought to defer to
reasonable agency interpretations of silent or ambiguous statutes if Congress
has expressly or implicitly delegated policymaking or law-interpreting power
to the agency.5" The Court did not provide a clear explanation or formula
Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing
Agency Interpretationsof Statutes, 73 TEX. L. REv. 83, 94-99 (1994) (same); Kenneth W.
Starr, JudicialReview in the Post-ChevronEra, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 284 (1986) (same).
46. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 840 (1984) (stating that revised rule allowed "bubbles" even if source was located in
area that did not attain national ambient air quality standards).
47. Id. at 862; see Merrill, Deference, supra note 23, at 977; Antonin Scalia, Judicial
Deference to Administrative Interpretationsof Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 517 (noting that
under Chevron, "there is no longer any justification for giving 'special' deference to 'longstanding and consistent' agency interpretations of law").
48. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
49. See id. at 843 n.9 ("The judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction and must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressional intent.").
50. See id. at 840, 843-45; Starr, supra note 45, at 288 (noting that Chevron's inquiry
whether agency interpretation is "permissible" is equivalent to whether agency action is
reasonable); Keith Werhan, Delegalizing Administrative Law, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 423, 457
(same).
51. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44. If a court finds "an express delegation of
authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation," the
court must accept the regulation unless it is "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary
to the statute." Id. On the other hand, if the legislative delegation is "implicit rather than
explicit," the "court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a
reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency." Id. at 844; see also
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for what constitutes an implicit delegation, but the close of Justice Stevens's
opinion suggested that a gap in congressional intent or statutory language
might be enough in some cases to create such an implicit delegation. 52
Justice Stevens suggested that agencies are usually better equipped than

judges at filling in gaps in complex statutory schemes because agencies are
closer to the political branches and possess greater expertise. The Court
observed that "considerable weight should be accorded to an executive
department's construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer"
and further stated that "an agency to which Congress has delegated
policymaking responsibilities may, within the limits of that discretion,
properly rely upon the incumbent administration's views of wise policy to
inform its judgments." I The Chevron Court also mentioned the EPA's
expertise as a reason for deference.'

B. The Chevron Era of JudicialDeference?
Many commentators initially believed that the Chevron decision was
revolutionary and established a new framework for administrative law.55
Before Chevron, courts were inconsistent about the degree of deference due
to administrative statutory interpretations, 56 but some decisions stated that
there was a presumption that courts ought to exercise independent judgment
Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency InterpretationsShould Bind Citizens and the Courts?, 7
YALE J. ON REG. 1, 25 (1990) (discussing Chevron's distinction between explicit and
implicit delegations).
52. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865-66; Anthony, supra note 51, at 32-35 (discussing
what constitutes implicit delegation under Chevron).
53. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844, 865.
54. See id. at 865; Merrill, Deference, supra note 23, at 977 n.39.
55. See Merrill, Deference, supra note 23, at 969-70 ("Indeed, read for all it is worth,
the decision would make administrative actors the primary interpreters of federal statutes
and relegate courts to the largely inert role of enforcing unambiguous statutory terms.");
Cass R. Sunstein, Law and AdministrationAfter Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 2071, 2075
(1990) ("[Chevron] has become a kind of Marbury, or counter-Marbury, for the administrative state."); Panel Discussion, JudicialReview of AdministrativeAction in a Conservative
Era, 39 ADMIm. L. REv. 353, 367 (1987) (documenting Professor Sunstein's discussion that
contrasted "strong" versus "weak" readings of Chevron).
56. See RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. ET AL., ADMINIsTRATIvE LAW AND PROCESS § 7.4,
at 348-49 (2d ed. 1992) (noting that prior to Chevron decision in 1984, "the Supreme Court
maintained two inconsistent lines of cases that purported to instruct courts concerning the
proper judicial role in reviewing agency interpretations of agency-administered statutes");
Seidenfeld, supra note 45, at 93-94 (suggesting that before Chevron, courts were inconsistent about amount of deference they paid to agency statutory interpretations; some courts
were quite deferential, others paid little heed to agency interpretations).
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about the meaning of statutes, and those decisions also stated that deference
to executive interpretations required special reasons.57 After Chevron, a
court apparently may exercise independent judgment only if Congress has
spoken to the precise question at hand, and deference to executive interpretations of statutes appears to be the norm. 8 Chevron justified this shift in
presumptions by invoking democratic theory. 59 Judges "are not part of either
political branch," and they "have no constituency." I On the other hand,
although agencies are "not directly accountable to the people," they are
subject to the general oversight and supervision of the President, who is a
nationally elected public official.61 In addition, Chevron appeared to presume
that whenever Congress delegated authority to administer a statute, it also
delegated authority to the agency to fill in any gaps present in the statute,
rather than leaving that role to the judiciary.62 Thus, although the traditional
approach to administrative law viewed the interpretation of ambiguous
statutes as a question of law, 63 Chevron transformed such interpretations into

a question of an agency "policy choice." I
Commentators disagreed about the extent to which Chevron required
judicial deference to an agency's statutory interpretations. I Commentators
57. See Merrill, Deference, supra note 23, at 977. See generally Skidmore v. Swift
& Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944) (establishing doctrine of cautious deference with regard to
agency statutory interpretations).
58. See Merrill, Deference, supra note 23, at 977.
59. See id. at 978; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of the Judiciary in Implementing
an Agency Theory of Government, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1239, 1239 n.1 (1989) (claiming that
Chevron provides best example of Supreme Court's increasing willingness to construct
public law doctrines designed to maximize power of people to control their agents). But see
E KRIDGE, supra note 12, at 290 (arguing that Chevron wrongly relies upon democratic
theory to justify judicial deference to agencies; instead, courts should try to enforce intent
of Congress, "whose members are elected by and accountable directly to the people").
60. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865-66.
61. See id.; Merrill, Deference, supra note 23, at 978 n.44 ("Chevron's democratic
theory thesis appears to presuppose a unitary executive, i.e., an interpretation of separation
of powers that would place all entities engaged in the execution of the law - including the
so-called independent regulatory agencies - under Presidential control.").
62. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44 (finding that Congress sometimes implicitly
delegates to agency authority to fill gap in statute); Merrill, Deference, supra note 23, at
979 ("Chevron in effect adopted a fiction that assimilated all cases involving statutory
ambiguities or gaps into the express delegation or 'legislative rule' model."); Scalia, supra
note 47, at 516-17 (suggesting that Chevron presumes that ambiguities entail delegation of
interpretative power).
63. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994); Werhan, supra note 50, at 457.
64. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844-45; Werhan, supra note 50, at 457.
65. Compare ESKRIDGE, supra note 12, at 162-63 ("Stevens's opinion in Chevron is
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have debated about whether Chevron announces a new paradigm in administrative law in which agencies would have the leading role in interpreting
statutes and formulating policy with limited judicial supervision, I or whether
Chevron merely establishes voluntary or flexible prudential limitations. 67
C. Empirical Evidence
Although many commentators initially assumed that Chevron would
substantially increase the likelihood that courts would affirm agency decisions,6" significant evidence reveals that the rate of affirmance of agencies in
the Supreme Court69 and circuit courts 'I is approximately the same or even
a legal process exemplar.... Chevron delivers the punch line for Hart and Sack's purposeoriented approach to statutory interpretation: especially in complicated technical regulatory
statutes, Congress cannot anticipate most problems of application."), with SUNSTEIN, supra
note 18, at 143, 224 (arguing that Chevron undermines traditional role of courts as ultimate
interpreter of statutes and allows agencies too much discretion to define scope of their own
authority).
66. See Seidenfeld, supra note 45, at 96-97 (arguing that strong reading of Chevron
"essentially transfers the primary responsibility for interpreting regulatory statutes from the
courts to the agency authorized to administer the statute"). See generally Cynthia R. Farina,
Statutory Interpretationand the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM.
L. REV. 452 (1989) (asserting that Chevron implicitly redefines separation of powers);
Douglas W. Kmiec, Judicial Deference to Executive Agencies and the Decline of the
Nondelegation Doctrine, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 269 (1988) (arguing that Chevron is logical corollary to courts' acceptance of extremely liberal delegations of authority to executive agencies
despite nondelegation doctrine).
67. See Seidenfeld, supra note 45, at 94-99 (stating that while courts have disagreed
to some extent about how to read Chevron, most "lower courts have applied its dictates with
unusual consistency and often with an almost alarming rigor"). See generally Maureen B.
Callahan, Must FederalCourts Defer to Agency Interpretationsof Statutes?:A New DoctrinalBasisfor Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 1991 Wis. L. REV.
1275 (arguing that Chevron is best interpreted as voluntary, prudential limitation on Supreme
Court's review of agencies and, therefore, should be applied flexibly, on case-by-case basis);
Sunstein, supra note 55 (arguing that Chevron should be re-interpreted so that reviewing
court may reject reasonable agency interpretations if court believes agency interpretation is
wrong).
68. See supra notes 45, 55, and accompanying text.
69. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Forward:Law as Equilibrium,
108 HARv.L. REv. 26, 72 (1994) (stating that Supreme Court affirmed only 62% of agency
civil cases in 1993 term); Merrill, Deference, supra note 23, at 984 (stating that Supreme
Court affirmed agency decisions about 70% of time for five years following Chevron as
compared to 75% for three years prior to that case).
70. See Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L. Spitzer, Solving the Chevron Puzzle, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1994, at 65, 103 (concluding that affirmance rate in federal
appellate courts dropped from mid-70% range in 1983-1987 to mid-60% range in 19881990); Peter H. Schuck & E.Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An EmpiricalStudy

1246

53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1231 (1996)

lower than before Chevron was decided in 1984."' Furthermore, the Supreme Court itself has continued to apply the Chevron framework in only
about one-third of the cases presenting a deference question. ' As a result
of this empirical evidence, a growing number of commentators have questioned whether Chevron has resulted in a significant increase in judicial
deference to agency interpretations. 3 Even some lower court decisions have
cast doubt on whether judges consistently employ Chevron.74 Some commentators argue that Chevron has not produced greater judicial deference to
of FederalAdministrativeLaw, 1990 DuKE L.J. 984, 1038 (finding that rate of affirmance
in federal appellate courts was 75.5% three years after Chevron as compared to 70.9% for
year preceding decision and concluding that Chevron significantly reduced rate at which
federal courts of appeals remanded cases based upon rejection of administrative agency's
interpretation of own statutes; however, effect had weakened somewhat by 1988).
71. See Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, JudicialIncentives and Indeterminacy
in Substantive Review of Administrative Decisions, 44 DUKE L.J. 1051, 1070-71 (1995);
supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text. There are significant limitations in all evidence
about the impact of Chevron because scholars disagree about how to measure when courts
affirm agency decisions, and there is the fundamental problem of comparing apples to
oranges because post-Chevron decisions do not necessarily pose the same issues as those
decided in Chevron. See Cohen & Spitzer, supra note 70, at 91-92 ("Although Merrill's
data were suggestive, they did not support his conclusions. Because the cases reviewed by
the Supreme Court change over time, the overall Supreme Court uphold rates reveal little
about changes in the Court's preferences for agency discretion and judicial deference.").
72. See Merrill, Deference, supra note 23, at 982; see also Merrill, Textualism, supra
note 23, at 361-62 (arguing that Supreme Court largely ignored Chevron framework during
1992 term); Shapiro & Levy, supra note 71, at 1071 (citing Merrill's work). But see Cohen
& Spitzer, supra note 70, at 91-92 (questioning Merrill's data).
73. See Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia Meets Tax Hyperopia:The Unproven Case of
IncreasedJudicialDeference to Revenue Rulings, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 637, 658 n.123, 657-60
(1996) (citing sources); Merrill, Textualism, supra note 23, at 361-62 (finding that Chevron
appeared to be playing "an increasingly peripheral role in the decisions" of Supreme Court
during its 1991 and 1992 terms and that Chevron was employed as "just another pair of
pliers in the statutory interpretation tool chest"). But see Pierce, supra note 37, at 749-50
("The Chevron test has largely realized its potential at the circuit court level. Appellate
courts routinely accord deference to agency constructions of ambiguous language in agencyadministered statutes."); Seidenfeld, supra note 45, at 84 n.5 ("Although [Merrill's Deference article, supra note 23] has led some commentators to question whether Chevron
represents the revolution in administrative law that many have proclaimed, the lower courts'
consistent application probably has a greater day-to-day impact on the administrative
operation of the state." (citation omitted)).
74. See Mississippi Poultry Ass'n v. Madigan, 31 F.3d 293, 299 n.34 (5th Cir. 1994)
(observing that "Chevron is not quite the 'agency deference' case that it is commonly
thought to be by many of its supporters (and detractors)"); Ohio State Univ. v. Secretary,
United States Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 996 F.2d 122, 123-24 n.1 (6th Cir. 1993);
Combee v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 248, 257-58 n.22 (1993) (Steinberg, J., dissenting); Caron,
supra note 73, at 659-60.
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agency determinations because the decision's framework is inherently indeterminate and manipulable. 75 As a result, judges can use Chevron to justify
decisions based on their ideological preferences. 7 6
If courts, including the Supreme Court itself, have not always followed
the deferential approach seemingly set forth in Chevron, it is important to
understand why and when courts are unlikely to be deferential. One important answer is that courts are concerned with fairness in individual cases.
Whatever the Supreme Court might announce as its test for judicial deference
to an agency's permissible interpretation of ambiguous statutes, lower court
judges are unlikely to defer to an agency interpretation of a statute that they
strongly believe is wrong.' 7 Although a judge's perception of fairness is
undoubtedly important in determining the outcome in an individual case, that
factor alone does not appear to be enough to explain the unexpectedly limited
impact of the Chevron decision.
Some commentators argue that a conservative Supreme Court in Chevron sought to force more liberal lower court judges to defer to the conservative Reagan agenda; however, during the Bush presidency, the Court encouraged an increasingly conservative judiciary, dominated by Reagan and Nixon
appointees, to reverse politically moderate agency policies.78 In 1992, the
election of President Clinton, a Democrat, increased the incentive for conservative judges to transfer power from agencies to courts.79 During the late
1980s and early 1990s, it is notable that the Supreme Court increasingly used
a textualist approach to statutory interpretation to justify such a shift in
power from agencies to courts.80 Undoubtedly, textualist judges like Justice
75. See Caron, supra note 73, at 658-59; Shapiro & Levy, supra note 71, at 1069-72.
76. See Caron, supra note 73, at 659; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Legislative Reform of
JudicialReview ofAgency Actions, 44 DUKE L.J. 1110, 1110-11 (1995); Shapiro & Levy,
supra note 71, at 1071-72; see also Zeppos, supra note 26, at 1333 n.179 ("IT]he effect of
Chevron may have been more in the area of judicial rhetoric than actual judicial
decisionmaking.").
77. Stephen Breyer, JudicialReview of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L.

REV. 363, 379-81 (1986).
78. See Cohen & Spitzer, supra note 70, at 68 & passim; see also Pierce, supranote
37, at 779-80 (discussing Cohen's and Spitzer's hypothesis).

79. See Cohen & Spitzer, supra note 70, at 108-09 (predicting that conservative
Supreme Court Justices would tend to affirm decisions that give less deference to administrative agencies); Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 69, at 76 (discussing how 1993 Supreme
Court term provides "some evidence" to support Cohen's and Spitzer's prediction); Pierce,
supra note 37, at 780 (discussing Cohen's and Spitzer's prediction about judicial review of

Clinton administration decisions).
80. See Merrill, Deference, supra note 23, at 970 & passim; Merrill, Textualism,
supra note 23, at 353-55, 372-73; Pierce, supra note 37, at 750-52; infra notes 92-93 and
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Scalia are motivated by more than purely political considerations, and their
commitment to textualist theory sometimes leads them to results at odds with
their political philosophies - but at least during the past several years,
textualist statutory interpretation has often served to weaken the powers of
administrative agencies. 1
D. Textualism and Chevron
The Chevron framework raises questions about how courts should
interpret statutes and when courts should defer to an agency's initial reading
of the relevant statute.'
Since the late 1980s, the Supreme Court has
increasingly applied Chevron in light of a textualist approach to its reviewing
role 83 and has often used textualism to reject agency statutory interpretations. 1 In theory, a textualist approach can result in either greater or less
deference to agency views, depending on whether the court finds that the text
is clear or ambiguous. I In practice, however, most textualist judges are
inclined to believe that they can find the proper interpretation of a statute in
its text without any assistance from an administrative agency. I Judges
accompanying text.
81. See infra notes 83-93 and accompanying text.
82. Anthony, supra note 51, at 18-25 (finding that court's approach to statutory
interpretation affects how it applies Chevron test); Merrill, Deference, supra note 23, at 990
(same); Pierce, supra note 37, at 750-52, 777-79 & passim (same); Seidenfeld, supra note
45, at 95-96 (observing that judges are much more likely to reverse agency interpretation
at Chevron's first step than its second, but proposing more stringent "reasonableness" review
at second step).
83. See National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Maine Corp., 503 U.S. 407, 41718 (1992) (Kennedy, J.) ("If the agency interpretation is not in conflict with the plain language of the statute, deference is due. In ascertaining whether the agency's interpretation
is a permissible construction of the language, a court must look to the structure and language
of the statute as a whole. If the text is ambiguous and so open to interpretation in some
respects, a degree of deference is granted to the agency, though a reviewing court need not
accept an interpretation which is unreasonable.") (citations omitted); Werhan, supra note 50,
at 459.
84. See Merrill, Deference, supra note 23, at 970 & passim; Merrill, Textualism,
supra note 23, at 353-55, 372-73; Pierce, supra note 37, at 750-52.
85. Compare Merrill, Deference, supra note 23, at 991 (arguing textualism undermines
Chevron framework by making judges less deferential to agency statutory interpretations),
and Merrill, Textualism, supra note 23, at 353-54 (same), with Werhan, supra note 50, at
459-60 ("The textualist understanding of Chevron review, however, is consistent with the
delegalization impulse of the decision.").
86. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 259-61 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (rejecting agency interpretation of statute as not reasonable); INS v. CardozaFonesca, 480 U.S. 421, 452 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); Herz, supra
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applying a textualist approach to statutory construction often believe they can
usually find the proper meaning of statutes through judge-made canons of

construction. 8

Judges applying a textualist approach may believe that

questions of interpretation are like solving a puzzle and that they are clever

enough to solve most of these puzzles without help from an agency. 8
In principle, most proponents of textualism are inclined to defer to an

agency's statutory interpretation because they usually prefer that judges not
overrule policies made by the executive branch.89 Justice Scalia, however,
is more likely to defer to an agency interpretation that construes a statute
narrowly and to find that a broad agency interpretation conflicts with the
statute's plain meaning and, therefore, is not entitled to Chevron deference. 90
A partial explanation of this tendency may stem from Justice Scalia's view
that a regulated firm claiming an injury from a regulation that exceeds an
agency's statutory authority is more likely to meet standing criteria than an
environmental group complaining that its individual members are being
harmed by an agency's underenforcement of a statutory mandate. 9'
note 42, at 198-99; Karkkainen, supra note 28, at 460; Merrill, Deference, supra note 23,
at 980-85 (noting that Supreme Court's use of textualist approach to statutory interpretation
resulted in less Chevron deference during 1988-1990 terms); Merrill, Textualism, supra note
23, at 355-63 (noting that Supreme Court's use of textualist approach to statutory interpretation resulted in less Chevron deference during 1992 term); Pierce, supra note 37, at 754-63
(arguing that Supreme Court during 1993-1994 term applied "hypertextoalist" approach that
led to insufficient application of Chevron deference principle).
87. See Merrill, Textualism, supra note 23, at 353, 372; Scalia, supra note 47, at 521;
supra notes 27, 30, and accompanying text; infra notes 173-76 and accompanying text.
88. See Merrill, Textualism, supra note 23, at 372; Pierce, supra note 37, at 779. On
the other hand, critics of textualism have argued that judges are often inept at understanding
the meaning of words. See EsKRIDGE, supra note 12, at 134 (arguing textualism sometimes
reduces statutory interpretation "to a linguistic shell game played by amateurs"); Solan,
supra note 40, at 113-17 (showing how ineptly judges use statutory language to define
meaning of statute and criticizing Justice Scalia in particular).
89. See Herz, supra note 42, at 198-99.
90. See Karkkainen, supra note 28, at 461.
91. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562-68 (1992) (Scalia, J.)
(holding that environmental group whose members only occasionally view endangered species in foreign countries cannot show concrete "injury in fact" and, therefore, lack standing
to challenge agency action under Endangered Species Act); Karkkainen, supra note 28, at
462-64; Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Justice Scalia, Standing and PublicLaw Litigation, 42 DUKE
L.J. 1141, 1167-68 (1993) (contending that Justice Scalia's approach to standing "threatens
to constitutionalize an unbalanced scheme of regulatory review" in which "courts can protect
the interests of regulated entities" while "'regulatory beneficiaries' are left to the political
process"). See generally Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits,
"Injuries," and Article 11, 91 MICH. L. REv. 163 (1992) (arguing Justice Scalia's approach
to standing in Lujan favors private economic interests and disfavors mere "beneficiaries" of
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There is evidence that the rise of Justice Scalia's textualist approach to
statutory interpretation coincided with a decline in the Court's willingness to
apply the Chevron deference model. During the 1988, 1989, and 1990
terms, just as Justice Scalia's textualist approach began to influence the Court
strongly, the Supreme Court was less likely to defer to agency statutory
constructions than it had been during the 1985 and 1986 terms.' From 1990
to 1994, the Supreme Court often used a textualist approach to find that a
statute had a plain meaning and, therefore, that an agency's interpretation of
the statute was not entitled to Chevron deference.9 3
IV. Why Textualists Miss the Policy Dilemmas of Environmental Law
This Part provides counterexamples that show it is not clear that a
textualist approach will necessarily lead to more victories for environmental
plaintiffs. Additionally, Part IV makes the broader argument that textualist
judges often disregard the delicate policy balances struck by agencies between cost and safety. Part IV.A shows that Congress often enacts environmental statutes with broad aspirational goals,' but also frequently includes
exemptions contained in the text's implementing provisions. Textualism does
not provide the best method to resolve the conflict in environmental statutes
between aspirational and limiting language. Rather, environmental agencies
are better suited to strike this balance. Part IV.B explains how a textualist
approach can be used to thwart environmental goals by reading the authority
of environmental agencies narrowly. Part IV.C illustrates why the textualist
method is sufficiently indeterminate that a textualist judge can decide many
cases either for or against environmental advocacy groups and maintains that
agencies are better situated to strike a balance among competing statutory
goals.
public interest statutes).
92. See Merrill, Deference, supra note 23, at 990-93. But see Cohen & Spitzer, supra
note 70, at 91-92 ("Although Merrill's data were suggestive, they did not support his
conclusions. Because the cases reviewed by the Supreme Court change over time, the
overall Supreme Court uphold rates reveal little about changes in the Court's preferences
for agency discretion and judicial deference.").
93. See Merrill, Textualism, supra note 23, at 355-63, 372-73 & passim (noting that
Supreme Court's use of textualist approach to statutory interpretation resulted in less
Chevron deference during 1992 term); Pierce, supra note 37, at 750-52, 762-63 & passim
(arguing that Supreme Court during 1993-1994 term applied hypertextualist approach that
led to insufficient application of Chevron deference principle).
94. See Dwyer, supra note 13, at 236-50 (analyzing aspirational language in Section
112 of Clean Air Act); Henderson & Pearson, supra note 6, at 1429-70 (discussing frequent
use of aspirational language in environmental statutes and problems often caused by such
language).
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A. The Nature of Environmental Statutes
Congress often enacts environmental statutes by overwhelming majorities and with ambitious goals,' but placates economic interests by placing
more restrictive language or exceptions in the legislation's implementing
provisions or legislative history.96 Congress frequently passes environmental
bills during periods of broad public enthusiasm, so-called "republican moments." '
Since the late 1960s, public support for environmentalism has
varied somewhat, but has remained relatively strong.98 Environmental
advocacy groups have enjoyed a fair amount of success at influencing legislation.9 Yet, most of the political controversy surrounding the enactment of
environmental law stems from the redistributive impact of such statutes,

95. Most major federal environmental statutes begin with a statement of congressional
findings about why the measure is needed or a declaration of its rationales, purposes, or
goals. See, e.g., Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2601 (1994); Endangered
Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (1994); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1994); Solid
Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6902 (1994); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401
(1994); Watson, supra note 12, at 202 n.10 (citing additional statutes). Neither the Comprehensive Environmental Response and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (1994), nor the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y, contain a
statement of findings or purpose. Watson, supranote 12, at 202 n.10.
96. See Richard J. Lazarus, Meeting the Demands of Integration in the Evolution of
Environmental Law: Reforming Environmental Criminal Law, 83 GEO. L.J. 2407, 2427
(1995); Watson, supra note 12, at 250-51.
97. See Daniel A. Farber, Politicsand Procedurein Environmental Law, 8 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 59, 66-67 (1992) (arguing that passage of many environmental statutes can be
attributed to "republican moments" of popular enthusiasm rather than to interest group
politics or actions of political elites); Donald T. Hornstein, Lessonsfrom FederalPesticide
Regulation on the Paradigmsand Politics of EnvironmentalLaw Reform, 10 YALE J. ON
REG. 369, 418-19, 422-27 (1993) (discussing "republican moment" explanation of pesticide
regulation).
98. See Farber, supra note 97, at 74-75. See generally Riley E. Dunlap, Public Opinion and Environmental Policy, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS AND POLICY 63-114 (James
P. Lester ed., 2d ed. 1995) (discussing public opinion data on public support for environmental programs). But see Richard J. Lazarus, The Tragedy of Distrust in the Implementation of FederalEnvironmentalLaw, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs., Autumn 1991, at 314,
342-45 (arguing that there is persistent public schizophrenia between public aspirations for
environmental quality and public's unwillingness to take steps necessary to achieve such
quality).
99. See Farber, supra note 97, at 60 ("Environmental groups manage to organize quite
effectively."); id. at 70-72 (stating that environmental groups play important role in legislative process by providing credible information that politicians can use); id. at 73-75
(discussing formation and growth of environmental groups); see also Helen M. Ingram et
al., Interest Groups and EnvironmentalPolicy, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS AND POLICY,
supra note 98, at 115-45.
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which create winners and losers among various industries and individual
firms within a particular industry. " This subpart will focus on compromise
language found in an environmental statute's text, and Part V will address
such limitations in its legislative history.
Because environmental statutes often contain subtle political compromises buried amidst bold aspirational language, courts must be sensitive to
the restrictive implementation provisions in the text and to the views of the
environmental agency in charge of implementing the statute. For instance,
in the purposes section of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean
Water Act), Congress declares that "[tihe objective of this chapter is to
restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the
Nation's waters." '' Some courts have relied on this purposes section to
construe other provisions of the Clean Water Act. 1' 2 For example, in
National Wildlife Federation v. Gorsuch, 03 the district court relied on this
broad aspirational language in interpreting other sections of the Act, declaring that Congress intended the statute's permit program to be comprehensive
and to cover any situation encompassed by the statutory language, whether
or not the particular application was contemplated by Congress at the time
of enactment. 104 The term "discharge of a pollutant" is defined as "any
addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source." 05 The
district court held that any adverse dam-induced water quality changes
constitute a "discharge of a pollutant" under the Act and ordered the EPA to
designate dams as a point source category for permitting requirements; in so
holding, the court rejected the agency's argument that many types of dams
do not add pollutants to navigable waters because the pollutants involved are
already in the reservoir water and, therefore, that dams are generally
nonpoint sources of pollution subject to less stringent regulation. 10 The

100. See Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing "EnvironmentalJustice": The Distributional
Effects of EnvironmentalProtection, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 787, 792-96 (1993); Lazarus, supra
note 96, at 2427.
101. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1994).
102. See Sierra Club v. Colorado Refining Co., 838 F. Supp. 1428, 1434 (D. Colo.
1993) ("Mhe Tenth Circuit has chosen to interpret the terminology of the Clean Water Act
broadly to give full effect to Congress['s] declared goal and policy . . . ."); Watson, supra
note 12, at 265 n.275 (citing cases in which courts relied on preambles of environmental law
statutes); infra note 109 and accompanying text.
103. 530 F. Supp. 1291 (D.D.C. 1982).
104. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 530 F. Supp. 1291, 1304 (D.D.C.), rev'd,
693 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
105. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12).
106. See Gorsuch, 530 F. Supp. at 1295-97, 1306-07, 1311-13. The EPA acknowl-

TEXTUALISM AND ENVIRONMENTALISM

1253

district court refused to defer to the EPA's view that the dams were nonpoint
sources because that interpretation "runs counter to expressed congressional
intent" and was "[in]consistent with the purpose and policies of the Act." 10
However, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
reversed the lower court, concluding that the EPA's interpretation - which
excluded certain varieties of dam-caused pollution from the Section 402
permit program - was reasonable, did not frustrate congressional intent, and
was entitled to "great deference.""' 8 Judge Wald warned that it was dangerous for a court to rely on aspirational language in an environmental statute
when construing the implementation language in another section of the statute
because "it is one thing for Congress to announce a grand goal, and quite

another for it to mandate full implementation. " °

The court of appeals

observed that "[c]aution is always advisable in relying on a general declaration of purpose to alter the apparent meaning of a specific provision" and,
therefore, that "Congress's expressed goal to eliminate 'the discharge of
pollutants' does not necessarily require that we expansively construe the term
'pollutant,' which Congress itself specifically defined." 110 The Clean Water
Act contains numerous provisions mandating that cost be considered in
establishing effluent limitations and various exemptions from such limitations
that were all arguably inconsistent with at least the spirit of the purposes
edged that nonpoint sources, including dams, are considered point sources when they emit
pollutants from discernible, discrete conveyances. Id. at 1312. Conversely, Judge Green
recognized that her order "will not force [the] EPA to require a permit for every dam in the
United States." Id. at 1313. She pointed out that "[miany dams may cause no pollution
problems whatsoever, and there are administrative options available to EPA, such as
categorical exemptions, areawide permits and general permits, which can minimize the
burden on both the [a]gency and dam owners and operators." Id.
107. Id. at 1311.
108. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 183 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The
EPA successfully argued that when water is aerated in excess of normal concentration, daminduced water quality changes involving low dissolved oxygen, cold, and supersaturation are
not point source pollutants under Section 502(6) subject to the Section 402 permit program,
but are nonpoint sources of pollution under Section 208. See id. at 161-66, 171-83; see also
33 U.S.C. §§ 1288, 1342, 1362(6) (1994).
109. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 178; see also United States v. Plaza Health Lab., Inc., 3
F.3d 643, 647 (2d Cir. 1993) (recognizing that while "broad remedial purpose" of Clean
Water Act is to restore and maintain integrity of Nation's waters, "[tihe narrow questions
posed by this case, however, may not be resolved merely by simple reference to this
admirable goal"); Watson, supra note 12, at 252 n.222 (same). But see Sierra Club v.
Colorado Refining Co., 838 F. Supp. 1428, 1434 (D. Colo. 1993) (noting that Tenth Circuit's broad interpretation gives full effect to Congress's goals); Watson, supranote 12, at
265 n.275 (citing cases in which courts relied on preambles of environmental law statutes).
110. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 178.
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section of the Act."' Furthermore, "Congress hedged the purposes section
'
by making it apply only as 'consistent with the provisions of this [Act]. t1
Judge Wald concluded that the EPA's interpretation did not plainly contradict
the text of the Act, that the statute's legislative history was ambiguous, and
"that the district court erred in relying on the legislative goals expressed in
§ 101(a)3 to invalidate EPA's otherwise reasonable construction" of the
statute. 1
Professor Lazarus's and Ms. Newman's observation that the texts of
environmental statutes often contain fewer pro-industry exemptions than their
legislative histories may be correct, but even the texts of such statutes
frequently include limiting language."I Accordingly, the fundamental
problem with textualism is that its use by courts is likely to lead to a flawed
approach when balancing aspirational and narrow economic language in a
statute. When interpreting an environmental statute, courts and agencies
must be sensitive to conflicts within the text between broad public goals
(e.g., protecting human health and environmental quality) and qualifications
that allow agencies to grant exemptions for industry when the costs of
regulation exceed its benefits." 5 Textualist courts applying traditional
statutory canons (e.g., a specific provision overcomes a general provision)" 6
are unlikely to come to grips with the policy dimensions of achieving a
workable balance between health and cost issues. In National Wildlife
Federationv. Gorsuch,"' the court of appeals appropriately deferred to the
EPA's balancing of conflicting statutory language in addressing the specific
problem of regulating dams, but a textualist judge might believe that she
could read the text as well as the EPA.
B. Textualism Can Be Used to Limit the Authority of
Environmental Agencies
Despite Professor Lazarus's and Ms. Newman's optimism about the
beneficial results of textualist interpretation, judges applying a textualist
111. See id.
112. Id. (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a)).
113. Id. at 179-81.
114. See supra notes 96, 109-11, and accompanying text.
115. See McNollgast, Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargainsin Statutory
Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 705, 739-40 (1992) ("Most regulatory legislation contains
conflicts between a broad, public-regarding, and unqualified mandate and implementing
sections that introduce qualifications."); Watson, supra note 12, at 251 n.217.
116. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 18, at 235-36 (listing statutory canons).

117. 693 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
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approach have often given a constricted reading to the text of an environmental statute and thereby concluded that an agency lacked the authority to
impose regulations on industry. For example, in Adamo Wrecking Co. v.
United States,"' the Court applied a textualist reading to the term "emission
standard" and concluded that an emission standard is a numerical limit on the
level of permissible emissions, as from a smokestack."1 9 In addition, the
Court held that the EPA did not have the authority to impose controls over
work practices such as requiring that asbestos-containing materials be wetted
down before a building is demolished to reduce the amount of asbestos
escaping into the ambient air. 20 In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens
criticized the majority for ignoring the EPA's contrary interpretation, important legislative history, and the practical reasons for the EPA's policy. 2l
Adamo Wrecking was a pre-Chevron decision, but the same restrictive
approach to statutory interpretation is still possible after Chevron if a court
concludes that the plain meaning of a statute does not allow the EPA to

engage in a particular type of regulation. "
For instance, Justice Thomas's dissenting opinion in PUD No. 1 v.
Washington Departmentof Ecology,'1 illustrates that a textualist approach to

118. 434 U.S. 275 (1978).
119. See Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 285-89 (1978).
120. See id.; 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-7(b)(1)(B) (1970) (amended 1978) (current version at
42 U.S.C. § 7412 (1994)); Herz, supra note 42, at 185 n.58 (noting that Congress swiffly
amended statute to reject Court's interpretation by enacting Pub. L. No. 95-623, § 13(b),
92 Stat. 3443, 3458 (1978), and asserting that 1990 Amendments to Clean Air Act have
drastically amended Section 112 of statute (citing Pub. L. No., 101-549, § 301, 104 Stat.
2399 (1990), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (1994))).
121. Adamo Wrecking Co., 434 U.S. at 294-307 (Stevens, J., dissenting); accord 1
WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENvIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR AND VATER 231, 345-47 (1986)
(criticizing Adamo Wrecking Court for its narrow reading of statute, failure to consider
relevant legislative history, and poor policy consequences of decision); Herz, supra note 42,
at 185 n.60 (same).
122. See American Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 52 F.3d 1113, 1119-20 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
(finding Section 211(k)(1) of Clean Air Act has "plain meaning" and that EPA had no
authority to promulgate 30% renewable oxygenate requirement for its regulations for reformulated gasoline to be used in nonattainment areas); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 51 F.3d 1053,
1058-62 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (finding "plain language" of Section 21 1(f)(4) of Clean Air Act
allowed waivers based only on fuel additive's effect on emission standards and, therefore,
EPA had no authority to consider health effects); Patricia M. Wald, EnvironmentalPostcards From the Edge: The Year That Was and the Year That Might Be, 26 ENVTL L. REP.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10182, 10184-85 (April 1996) (noting that courts applying plain meaning
approach to statutory construction often refuse to look at broad statutory goals or purposes
and therefore frequently decline to presume delegation of congressional power to agency).
123. 114 S. Ct. 1900, 1915-19 (1994) (Thomas, I., dissenting).
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statutory interpretation will not always lead to favorable results for environmentalists. 24 In PUD, the Supreme Court held that the Washington State
Department of Ecology could condition certification of hydroelectric power
plants on the applicant's meeting minimum stream flow rates that the Department had imposed pursuant to Section 401 of the Clean Water Act. 11 Justice
O'Connor's majority opinion concluded that the EPA's interpretation of
Section 401, which authorized the Department's imposition of minimum
stream flow requirements, was a "reasonable interpretation" of an ambiguous
Justice
statute and, therefore, entitled to deference under Chevron."
such
an
required
statute"
of
the
terms
"the
literal
O'Connor also stated that
7
2
interpretation. 1
In dissent, Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, argued that the
majority had misinterpreted the statute by too broadly reading language in
Section 401(d) allowing a state to impose "other limitations" beyond the
effluent limitations required by Section 301 of the Act, and also argued that
the Court's interpretation would allow states to impose virtually any condition on applicants for a permit under the Act." Justice Thomas demonstrated a palpable pro-development bias when he argued that stream flow
levels established by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)
ought to prevail over state-imposed levels because "[i]n issuing licenses,
FERC must balance the Nation's power needs together with the need for
energy conservation, irrigation, flood control, fish and wildlife protection,
and recreation. State environmental agencies, by contrast, need only consider parochial environmental interests."129
In a brief concurring opinion, Justice Stevens argued that "[fjor judges
who find it unnecessary to go behind the statutory text to discern the intent
124.

See PUD No. 1 v. Washington Dep't of Ecology, 114 S. Ct..1900, 1915-19 (1994)

(Thomas, J., dissenting).
125. See id. at 1910-11; see also 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)-(d) (1994); Debra L. Donahue,
The Untapped Power of Clean Water Act Section 401, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 201, 207-17 (1996)
(discussing PUD).

126. PUD, 114 S. Ct. at 1909.
127. Id. at 1910; see Pierce, supra note 37, at 754 n.26.
128. PUD, 114 S. Ct. at 1915-19 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 1920 (first emphasis in original) (citation omitted). It is noteworthy that
Justices Scalia and Thomas normally are favorably disposed to protecting the interests of
State governments against federal intrusion except apparently in the case of state environmental regulation. See generally Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 116 S.Ct. 1114
(1996) (Justices Scalia and Thomas joining in majority holding that Congress lacks power
under Indian Commerce Clause to abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit
in federal court and thereby to subject states to federal court jurisdiction in suits by Indian
tribes under Indian Gaming Regulatory Act).
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of Congress, this is (or should be) an easy case" both because nothing in the
Act restricts the power of states to regulate the quality of their waters more
stringently than federal law might require and because "the Act explicitly
recognizes states' ability to impose stricter standards."' 30 Even if textualism
is in theory more favorable to environmental interests, a judge who is hostile
to environmental values can easily manufacture a textualist argument for
ruling against the environment.
C. Textualist InterpretationIs Indeterminate
This subpart examines two recent Supreme Court decisions, City of
Chicago and Sweet Home, to demonstrate that the textualist method is
sufficiently indeterminate that a textualist judge could have decided these two
cases either for or against environmental advocacy groups. Although other
methods of statutory interpretation may not provide a clearer answer to a
statute's meaning, it is notable that textualists tend to be convinced about the
trustworthiness of their methodology and are predisposed to deprecate the
views of the implementing agency.
1. City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund
a. Background
Although City of Chicago provides the strongest evidence for the
Lazarus-Newman thesis that textualist statutory interpretation is pro-environmentalist, a textualist judge could have easily ruled the other way. In light
of this indeterminacy, the Supreme Court ought to have given more weight
to the EPA's interpretation. Subtitle C of the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act "empowers" the EPA to establish a comprehensive "cradle to
grave" system to regulate the generation, transport, storage, treatment, and
disposal of hazardous wastes.'
In 1980, the EPA exempted "household
waste" from Subtitle C regulation because household waste usually contains
only a very small percentage of hazardous waste materials, but the cost to
municipalities of segregating that small amount for separate disposal would
be extremely high. 1 However, municipalities wanted to expand the ash
130. PUD, 114 S. Ct. at 1915 (Stevens, J., concurring).
131. See City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund, 114 S. Ct. 1588, 1590
(1994); Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 337 n.1 (1994) (defining
hazardous waste and its regulation procedures); see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-6949 (1994)
(including no specifications about which wastes are Subtitle C hazardous wastes and
directing Administrator of EPA to develop criteria for "identiting the characteristics of
hazardous waste" and for "listing hazardous waste").
132. See Hazardous Waste Management System: Identification and Listing of Hazardous
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exemption to mixed household and other nonhazardous waste because collectors often do not separate these types of waste and because large municipal
resource recovery facilities need huge volumes of mixed waste to be economical.133
In 1984, Congress added a number of amendments to the statute,
including Section 3001(i), which was entitled "Clarification of Household
Waste Exclusion."1'34 Section 3001(i) declared that a "resource recovery
facility" burning "municipal solid waste" - which includes both household
waste and nonhazardous waste from commercial and industrial sources "shall not be deemed to be treating, storing, disposing of, or otherwise
managing hazardous wastes" under Subtitle C.135 In addition, a Senate report
accompanying the 1984 amendment stated that "[a]ll waste management
activities of such a facility, including the generation, transportation, treatment, storage and disposal of waste shall be covered by the exclusion." 136
The EPA initially appeared to take the view that ash from the burning of
mixed household and nonhazardous waste could be hazardous waste, but
after several years of taking conflicting positions in congressional testimony,
the EPA finally sided with the
exemption position favored by municipal
37
waste.
mixed
of
incinerators
Waste, 45 Fed. Reg. 33,084, 33,104 (1980); City of Chicago, 114 S.Ct. at 1590-91. Beyond
declaring that household waste is not hazardous waste, the 1980 regulations provided a "waste
stream" exemption for household waste that exempted household wastes from generation
through treatment (including incineration) to final disposal of residues (including ash). Id. at
1591. Thus, an incinerator that burned only household waste was exempt from Subtitle C
regulations for both hazardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal facilities as well as those
regulations for generators of hazardous waste and was therefore free to dispose of its ash in
a Subtitle D nonhazardous waste landfill. Id.; Lazarus & Newman, supra note 2, at 7.
133. Lazarus & Newman, supra note 2, at 8. -The critical question apparently was
whether the ash residue from such incinerated mixed waste was exempt from Subtitle C. The
1980 regulations did not exempt municipal waste combustion ash from Subtitle C coverage if
the incinerator that produced the ash burned anything in addition to household waste, including
nonhazardous industrial waste. City of Chicago, 114 S. Ct. at 1591. If the mixed ash was
sufficiently toxic, a facility such as petitioner's would fall within the scope of Subtitle C
hazardous waste generator regulations. Id. Such a facility would not fall within the ambit of
Subtitle C treatment, storage, and disposal facilities regulations because all the waste it burned
would be characterized as nonhazardous. Id. An ash can be hazardous, however, even if the
product from which the ash is generated is not hazardous because contaminants in the new
medium are more concentrated and readily leachable. Id.
134. Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. 98-616, § 223, 98 Stat.
3221, 3252 (1984).
135. 42 U.S.C.. § 6921(i).
136. S.REP. No. 98-284, at 61 (1983).
137. On September 18, 1992, just seven weeks before the presidential election, EPA
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The City of Chicago could win either if the Court held that the plain
meaning of Section 3001(i) required an exemption for mixed household and
nonhazardous waste, or if the Court concluded that the statute was ambiguous and that the EPA's construction of the statute was permissible within the
meaning of Chevron. 3 ' The City argued that Section 3001's plain meaning
required an exemption for ash because it stated that a resource recovery facil13 9
ity "shall not be deemed to be ... disposing of ... hazardous wastes";
because ash is the only material that such a facility would be "disposing of,"
the statute must intend to exempt such material from the definition of hazardous waste. The Environmental Defense Fund, however, argued that the
exemption applied only to the facility itself and not to the ash the facility
generated. '4
b. The Supreme Court
Justice Scalia's majority opinion, which all members of the Court except
Justices Stevens and O'Connor joined, adopted the Environmental Defense
Fund's plain meaning argument. 141 According to Justice Scalia, "[t]he plain
meaning of [Section 3001(i)] is that as long as a facility recovers energy by

incineration of the appropriate waste, it (the facility) is not subject to Subtitle
C regulation as a facility that treats, stores, disposes of, or manages hazardous waste. "42 On the other hand, Section 3001(i) "quite clearly does not
Administrator William Reilly sent a memorandum to all agency regional offices announcing
that he interpreted the text and legislative history of Section 3001(i) to exempt municipal
combustion ash from Subtitle C regulation even if the material failed the agency's toxicity
characteristic analysis, and further argued that such an exemption best served both environmental and resource recovery goals for nonhazardous solid waste. See Lazarus & Newman,
supra note 2, at 9-10 (citing Memorandum from the EPA Administrator to Regional
Administrators Regarding Exemption for Municipal Waste Combustion Ash from Hazardous
Waste Regulation (Sept. 18, 1992)).
138. Most commentators thought that the City would win, and that its stronger claim
was the Chevron deference argument. See Lazarus & Newman, supra note 2, at 2-3, 10-11.
The City, however, emphasized its plain meaning argument because a Chevron deference
victory might be pyrrhic if the EPA later changed its interpretation of the statute. See id.
at 11.
139. Brief for the City of Chicago at 14-18, City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense
Fund, 114 S. Ct. 1588 (1994) (No. 92-1639) [hereinafter Chicago Brief]; Lazarus &
Newman, supra note 2, at 12. The City also relied on the 1984 Senate report as further
evidence that Congress intended to exclude municipal combustion ash from Subtitle C
because ash is the only material "generated" by a resource recovery facility. Chicago Brief,
supra, at 23-28; Lazarus & Newman, supra note 2, at 12.
140. Lazarus & Newman, supra note 2, at 9.
141. See id. at 19-20.
142. City of Chicago, 114 S. Ct. at 1591.
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contain any exclusion for the ash itself. Indeed, the waste the facility produces (as opposed to that which it receives) is not even mentioned." 143 In
addition, the Court concluded that Section 3001(i) "does not even exempt the
facility in its capacity as a generatorof hazardous waste" because the statute
does not include the word "generating" among the list of resource recovery
facility activities that are exempt from Subtitle C regulation. 1" According
to the Court: "We think it follows from the carefully constructed text of
[S]ection 3001(i) that while a resource recovery facility's management
activities are excluded from Subtitle C regulation, its generation of toxic ash

is not."

145

In accordance with his textualist approach to statutory interpretation,
Justice Scalia characteristically refused to consider legislative history in the
Senate committee report that included "generation" among the list of exempt
activities. 1" The Court cautioned that "it is the statute, and not the Committee Report, which is the authoritative expression of the law, and the statute
prominently omits reference to generation." 147
The Court acknowledged that the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act's "twin goals of resource recovery and protecting against contamination
sometimes conflict. "1 The Court stated that the statutory text was "the most
reliable guide" for reconciling diverse statutory purposes. 149 The Court rejected the Solicitor General's plea for deference under Chevron to the EPA's
interpretation of the statute because, in the majority's view, the agency's
interpretation "goes beyond the scope of whatever ambiguity [Section]
3001(i) contains. . . . Section 3001(i) simply cannot be read to contain the
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1592. The statute exempts facilities "treating, storing, disposing of, or

otherwise managing hazardous wastes." Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 6921(i) (1994).
145. City of Chicago, 114 S. Ct. at 1592. The Court also concluded that Section
3001(i) had overruled the waste stream exemption in the EPA's 1980 regulations and,
therefore, that ash generated exclusively from household waste was now subject to Subtitle
C generator requirements. Id. at 1593; see Lazarus & Newman, supra note 2, at 22-23
(stating that City had probably assumed that likely worst case scenario if it lost was that it
would have to bum only household waste; thus, Court's determination that Section 3001(i)
preempted EPA's pre-existing 1980 rule was stunning defeat for City).
146. See City of Chicago, 114 S.Ct. at 1593 (refusing to rely upon word "generation"
in committee report, S. REP. No. 98-294, at 61 (1983), that was not included in statutory

text).
147. Id. at 1593. The Court observed that nothing in the dissent or legislative history
"convinces us that the statute's omission of the term 'generation' is a scrivener's error." Id.
at 1593 n.3.
148. Id. at 1594.
149. Id.
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cost-saving waste stream exemption petitioners seek."' 5
Justice Stevens's dissent, in which Justice O'Connor joined, argued that
"[t]he relevant statutory text is not as unambiguous as the Court asserts,"' 15'
and that the 1984 Senate report's inclusion of the term "generation" was
more representative of Congress's probable intent than the text's omission of
that same word. 52 The dissent essentially argued that Section 3001(i) could
reasonably be read to extend the reach of the EPA's 1980 waste stream
exemption for household waste to the incineration of mixtures of household
wastes and nonhazardous commercial and industrial wastes, while at the
same time preserving the 1980 rule's scope. 53 Justice Stevens's dissent
concluded that Congress wanted the EPA rather than the judiciary to balance
environmental, recovery, and cost issues. 'm
c. Analysis
While the City of Chicago decision provides significant support for the
Lazarus-Newman thesis that a textualist approach often allows fewer exceptions from environmental statutes for regulated industries than a method of
statutory construction that relies heavily upon legislative history, there are
aspects of the decision that ought to be troubling to environmentalists. First,
Justice Scalia's opinion tends to read the authority of the EPA restrictively
and to deny the agency regulatory flexibility. In a different context, a
narrow textualist interpretation of a statute could leave the EPA or another
agency without p6wer to protect the environment or public health. Furthermore, textualism can be a double-edged sword because many statutes could
plausibly be read two different ways: either for or against the environment.
Looking at the text of Section 3001(i) alone, Justice Scalia may well have
150. Id. Because the Court concluded that the statute was clear and Chevron deference
to the EPA's interpretation was not warranted, the Court did not consider the interesting

question of whether "an agency interpretation expressed in a memorandum like the
Administrator's in this case is entitled to any less deference under Chevron than an interpretation adopted by a rule published in the Federal Register, or by adjudication." Id. at 1594

n.5. That issue is beyond the scope of this Article. For the purposes of this Article, the
important point is that the Court should have deferred to the EPA's interpretation if it had
been duly promulgated through notice-and-comment rulemaking in the Federal Register
pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1994) (setting forth

requirements for notice-and-comment rulemaking).
151. City of Chicago, 114 S. Ct. at 1593 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
152. See id. at 1596-97 n.7 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
153. See id. at 1594-98 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Lazarus & Newman, supra note 2, at

22.
154. See City of Chicago, 114 S. Ct. at 1598 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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had the better argument, as six other justices agreed, but some lower court
judges and commentators thought the statutory language could be read to
mean the exact opposite - that municipal waste combustion ash was automatically exempt from Subtitle C regulation.'5 Even Professor Lazarus and
Ms. Newman recognized in a subsequent law review article that "the definition of 'plain meaning' is itself anything but plain" and that there were "cer56
tainly ample superficial signs of ambiguity" concerning Section 3001(i).
Because textualist analysis often does not yield a determinate interpretation,
courts ought to consider a statute's legislative history. The 1984 Senate
report provided a more definite explanation of Section 3001(i)'s intent than
did its text.
Most importantly, the majority erred in asserting that the text provided
"the most reliable guide" for reconciling the statute's sometimes conflicting
"twin goals of resource recovery and protecting against contamination." 11
In light of the statutory scheme's mind-numbing complexity, 5 8 Justice
Stevens's dissent appropriately argued that Congress wanted the EPA rather
than the courts to answer the question of whether the costs of requiring
municipal incinerators to comply with Subtitle C are justified by the additional benefits gained. 59
2. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities
for a Great Oregon
One year after City of Chicago, the Supreme Court abandoned rigid
textualism and took a more deferential view toward agency decisionmaking
in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon.11
155. See Environmental Defense Fund v. Wheelabrator Techs., Inc., 931 F.2d 211, 213
(2d Cir. 1991) (holding that Section 3001(1) exempts municipal combustion ash from Subtitle
C hazardous waste regulation); Lazarus & Newman, supra note 2, at 3 n.10 (noting that
most commentators thought City of Chicago was more likely to prevail on plain meaning
argument than Environmental Defense Fund); id. at 15-19 (describing Environmental
Defense Fund attorneys' discussion of objections to their plain meaning argument).
156. Lazarus & Newman, supra note 2, at 15-16.
157. City of Chicago, 114 S.Ct. at 1594.
158. See American Mining Congress v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1177, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(describing process of interpreting statute as "mind-numbing journey").

159. See City of Chicago, 114 S.Ct. at 1598 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Diane
L. Hughes, Note, Justice Stevens's Method of Statutory Interpretation:A Well-Tailored
Means for FacilitatingEnvironmentalRegulation, 19 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 493, 495-96
(1995) (arguing that Justice Stevens only applies Chevron deference to agency interpretations
when good case exists for interstitial agency lawmaking).
160. 115 S.Ct. 2407 (1995).
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Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion and Justice Scalia dissented in a
161
six-to-three decision.
a. Background
Section 9(a)(1)(B) of the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA) makes
it unlawful for any person to "take" an endangered species, 62 and Section
3(19) defines "take" to mean to "harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound,
kill, trap, capture, or collect, or attempt to engage in any such conduct."1 63
The Fish and Wildlife Service of the Interior Department, acting under the
authority of the Secretary of Interior, defined the word "harm" in Section
3(19) to include "significant habitat modification or degradation where it
actually kills or injures wildlife. "'6 The timber industry and property rights
activists contended that the regulation's definition was broader than Congress
had intended when it enacted the statute. 6"
b.. The Supreme Court
Justice Stevens's majority opinion argued that the text of the statute
provided three reasons for concluding that the Secretary of Interior's interpretation of the statute was reasonable."6 First, the Court used the dictionary definition of the verb form of "harm," which is "to cause hurt or
damage to: injure," to find that the agency's definition was consistent with
the "ordinary understanding" of the word and that such a "definition naturally encompasses habitat modification that results in actual injury or death
to members of an endangered or threatened species." 67 Second, the Court
161. Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion, which was joined by Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Justice O'Connor also filed a concurring opinion. Justice Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist

and Justice Thomas. Babbit v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon,
115 S.Ct. 2407, 2409 (1995).

162. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (1994); see Starla K. Dill, Note, Animal Habitatsin
Harm's Way: Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon v. Babbitt, 25
ENVTL. L. 513, 516 (1995).
163. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19); Dill, supra note 162, at 516.
164. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1994); Dill, supra note 162, at 516.

165. See generally Craig Robert Baldauf, Comment, Searchingfor a Place to Call
Home: Couts, Congress, and Common Killers Conspire to Drive EndangeredSpecies Into
Extinction, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 847 (1995).
166. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2412.
167. Id. at 2412-13. The Court rejected the argument that the word "harm" in the Act
should be limited to direct attempts to kill an endangered species and not apply to indirect
harms resulting from habitat destruction; the Court pointed out that the dictionary definition

does not limit itself to direct injuries and, furthermore, that the word "harm" as used in the
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found that "the broad purpose of the ESA supports the Secretary's decision
to extend protection against activities that cause the precise harms Congress
enacted the statute to avoid." 168 Third, the Court concluded that Congress's
addition of Section 10, the "incidental take" permit provision, to the 1982
amendments 69 evidenced that Congress understood the Act to apply to
indirect as well as direct harm.17 The Court reached this conclusion because
it found that the most likely use for such a permit, which the Secretary
grants as an exception to Section 9(a)(1)(B)'s prohibition against takings of
endangered species to an individual whose activities will cause incidental
harm to an endangered species if the applicant provides a satisfactory conservation plan for minimizing any such harm, was to avert liability for habitat
modification."' In addition, the Court stated that the plain meaning of
Section 10's requirement of a conservation plan makes sense only as "an
alternative to a known, but undesired, habitat modification." "
In addition, the Court criticized the court of appeals' use of the noscitur
a sociis canon of statutory construction to conclude that "'harm' must refer
to a direct application of force because the words around it do," given that
"[s]everal of the words that accompany 'harm' in the [Section] 3 definition
of 'take,' especially 'harass,' 'pursue,' 'wound,' and 'kill,' refer to actions
or effects that do not require the direct applications of force"; the Court also
criticized the court of appeals for giving the word "'harm' essentially the
same function as other words in the definition, thereby denying it independent meaning." 174 Although textualists try to rely on canons of construction
to resolve the meaning of ambiguous words,1 75 courts, as in this case, often
disagree about which canon is most suitable for understanding a text's
meaning. 176
statute would be mere surplusage unless it encompassed indirect harms. Id. at 2413.
168. Id. The Supreme Court reaffirmed the reasoning from TVA v.Hill, which stated
that "[t]he plain intent of Congress in enacting this statute was to halt and reverse the trend
toward species extinction, whatever the cost. This is reflected not only in the stated policies
of the Act, but in literally every section of the statute." Id. at 2413 (quoting TVA v. Hill,
437 U.S. 153, 184 (1978)).
169. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B) (1994).
170. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2414.
171. See id.
172. Id.at 2414 n.14.
173. According to the noscitura sociis canon of statutory construction, words tend to
have the same meaning as their surrounding statutory language.
174. Sweet Home, 115 S.Ct. at 2414-15.
175. See supra notes 30, 116, and accompanying text.
176. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 12, at 275 (noting that courts can choose among
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Finally, the Court, invoking the Chevron deference principle, found that
the definition of the word "harm" in the statute was ambiguous and that the
Secretary's interpretation was reasonable. 1v Citing a 1986 law review article
by Justice Breyer written before his appointment to the Supreme Court,17 the
majority asserted that "[t]he latitude the ESA gives the Secretary in enforcing
the statute, together with the degree of regulatory expertise necessary to its
enforcement, establishes that we owe some degree of deference to the
Secretary's reasonable interpretation" and that "[w]hen it enacted the ESA,
Congress delegated broad administrative and interpretive power to the
Secretary.... The proper interpretation of a term such as 'harm' involves
a complex policy choice." 17 9 The Court concluded: "When Congress has
entrusted the Secretary with broad discretion, we are especially reluctant to
substitute our views of wise policy for [the Secretary's]."'
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia argued that the words "take" and
"harm" as used in the Act could not possibly mean "habitat modification." 1 81
Furthermore, Justice Scalia contended that even if the Secretary's regulation
served the broad purpose of the statute, the majority had failed to demonstrate that the whole text of the statute justified a ban on significant habitat
modification by private persons. 112
Notably, Justice Scalia argued that the majority's approach was inconsistent with the plain meaning approach to statutory interpretation in his City of
Chicago decision. First, Justice Scalia asserted that it was inappropriate for
the majority to examine the legislative history of the 1973 Act "when the
enacted text is as clear as this. ""n In addition, Justice Scalia conceded that
different statutory canons to reach desired result); KARL N. LLEWELLYN, TH

COMMON

LAW TRADITON: DECIDING APPEALs 521-35 (1960) (compiling list to demonstrate that every

canon has countercanon).
177. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2416. In addition, according to the Court, the
legislative history of the statute supported the conclusion that the Secretary's definition of

harm was based upon a permissible construction of the Act. Id. at 2416-17.
178. Id. at 2416 (citing Breyer, supra note 77, at 373). Breyer joined the Supreme
Court after the City of Chicago decision, but in time for the Sweet Home decision.
179. Id. at 2416, 2418.
180. Id. at 2418 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984)).
181. Id. at 2421-26 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
182. Id. at 2426 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
183. Id. at 2426-27 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing City of Chicago v. Environmental
Defense Fund, 114 S. Ct. 1588, 1593 (1994)). Justice Scalia also disagreed with the
majority's interpretation of the legislative history of the 1973 Act, arguing that Congress

intended that the Section 5 land acquisition program would be the sole means to address the
destruction of critical habitat by private persons on private land. Id. at 2427-28 (Scalia, J.,
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the legislative history of the 1982 amendments "clearly contemplate[s] that
it will enable the Secretary to permit environmental modification," but he
strongly contended that it was inappropriate to consider this legislative
history when "the text of the amendment cannot possibly bear that asserted
meaning, when placed within the context of an Act that must be interpreted
(as we have seen) not to prohibit private environmental modification.""
Citing the City of Chicago decision, Justice Scalia maintained that "[t]he
neutral language of the amendment cannot possibly alter that interpretation,
nor can its legislative history be summoned forth to contradict, rather than
clarify, what is in its totality an unambiguous statutory text.""
c. Analysis
The majority opinion in Sweet Home was inconsistent with the spirit and
tone of Justice Scalia's narrow textualist majority opinion in City of
Chicago." 6 Even to the extent that Justice Stevens applied a textualist
approach to reading the ESA, he read the word "harm" more broadly than
Justice Scalia, illustrating that the use of a plain meaning or textualist approach to statutory construction does not always result in a consensus. In
any difficult case involving statutory construction, a judge applying a textualist approach easily could rule either in favor of or against an environmental
advocacy group. Other methods of statutory interpretation mayp produce
equally indeterminate results, but textualists are perhaps more inclined to
think they can solve interpretation issues without deferring to the experience
of administrative agencies.
One may speculate that Justice Breyer's addition to the Court was a
factor in the Court's shift from a plain meaning statutory interpretation
approach that rejected the EPA's interpretation of whether ash is hazardous
waste to a deferential application of Chevron in approving the Fish and
Wildlife Service's definition of "take" and "harm.'
Probably because
three members of the City of Chicago majority had joined his majority
opinion in Sweet Home,' Justice Stevens avoided the delicate issue of
dissenting).
184. Id. at 2428 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
185. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing City of Chicago, 114 S. Ct. at 1593).
186. See supra notes 141-50 and accompanying text.
187. See Lazarus & Newman, supra note 2, at 22 ("Indeed, one could speculate that
if Justice Breyer had been on the Court at the time of [the City of Chicago] litigation, the
case might have been decided differently.").
188. Justices Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg were in the majority in both City of
Chicago and Sweet Home.
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whether the two cases were consistent, but his silence on the issue means that
one can only guess whether and how the Supreme Court will apply Chevron
in future cases. The Supreme Court needs to develop a consistent approach
for reading complex regulatory statutes and for employing Chevron.
D. Textualists Devalue Environmental Agencies
It is not clear whether adopting a consistently textualist approach to
statutory interpretation would result in a greater or lesser number of victories
for environmental advocacy groups, but considerable evidence indicates that
textualists tend to devalue the policy balances struck by environmental
agencies between broad pro-environmental aspirational language and narrow
pro-industry exceptions. In particular, the Supreme Court's Adamo decision,
Justice Thomas's dissenting opinion in PUD, and Justice Scalia's dissenting
opinion in Sweet Home demonstrate how a narrow textualist reading of
environmental statutes can result in courts allowing agencies too little authority to regulate environmental harm. If textualist analysis frequently produced
clear answers about Congress's statutory intent, then it might be appropriate
for courts to override the views of agencies. However, environmental statutes often contain conflicting or ambiguous provisions, and agencies are in
the best position to adopt an interpretation that addresses a wide range of
policy concerns.
V. Why Both Courts and Agencies Should
Consider Legislative History
Professor Lazarus and Ms. Newman concede that textualist statutory
interpretation will sometimes lead courts to ignore legislative history that
favors the environment, but they are willing to forgo such favorable material
to keep out information indicating that the legislature intended to allow
exceptions to aspirational textual language.189 Although a statute's legislative
history sometimes does not reflect congressional intent and judges can misuse
such material to reach a result at odds with the legislature's intent or purpose, interpreters should consider both a statute's text and its relevant
legislative history as the best means to ascertain the intent of the legislature.
As Part VI explains, only after a court or agency determines which interpretation most probably captures a statute's intent should it possibly allow policy
considerations to outweigh that intent. 190

189. Lazarus & Newman, supra note 2, at 23.
190. See infra notes 298-300, 309-11, and accompanying text.
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A. General Principlesof Legislative History

For most of the nineteenth century, judges focused on statutory texts,
policy concerns, and canons of construction, but during the twentieth century, courts came to rely quite extensively on legislative history materials.191
In theory, judges generally agree that consultation of legislative history is
unnecessary if the statutory text has a plain and unambiguous meaning. 92
In practice, judges have often relied on contradictory legislative history to
justify an interpretation of a statute that appears to be at odds with its textual
meaning." 9 In 1983, Judge Patricia Wald remarked that "[n]o occasion for
statutory construction now exists when the [Supreme] Court will not look at
the legislative history." '"
1. The Textualist Critique of Legislative History
Beginning in the late 1980s, a critical mass of judges and scholars, most
notably Justice Scalia, began to castigate the use of legislative history in
interpreting statutes and instead advocated some type of textualist approach
to statutory interpretation.1 95 Because Justices Scalia and Thomas are generally unwilling to join any part of another Justice's opinion that relies upon
legislative history, they have been able to influence other Justices who want
their votes and who are willing to drop references to legislative history.196
The majority of Justices on the Court, however, have remained willing to
consider legislative history and have rejected a rigid textualist approach to
legislative history. "
191. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 12, at 207. See generally Carro & Brann, supra note
37 (providing statistical study showing that Supreme Court increasingly used legislative

history from 1938 to 1979 and that increase in usage was especially rapid after 1970). In
1892, the Supreme Court used evidence from a committee report to conclude that a statute's

general prohibition against labor contracts to assist immigration did not apply to clergy. See
Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 464-65 (1892); ESKRIDGE, supra note
12, at 208-10.
192. See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) (citing Hamilton v.
Rathbone, 175 U.S. 414, 421 (1899)); Spence, supra note 26, at 590.
193. See Spence, supra note 26, at 590; Wald, supra note 37, at 197-99.
194. Wald, supra note 37, at 195; see also ESKRIDGE, supra note 12, at 207.
195. See generally Orrin Hatch, Legislative History: Tool of Constructionor Destruction, 11 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 43 (1988); Jerry L. Mashaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism, and the Interpretationof Federal Statutes, 32 WM. & MARY L. REv. 827 (1991); W.
David Slawson, Legislative History and the Need to Bring Statutory InterpretationUnder the
Rule of Law, 44 STAN. L. REv. 383, 383-84 (1992).
196. See Merrill, Textualism, supra note 23, at 365-66.

197. See Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 610-11 n.4 (1991)
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Textualists frequently argue that it is improper to rely upon material that
was never voted on by the House or Senate and never presented to the
President as legislation.198 Some textualists allege that legislators rarely read
committee reports, which judges usually regard as the most reliable form of
legislative history199 and, therefore, claim that judges ignore reality in most
instances if they treat such reports as embodying the intent of Congress.'
Even worse, textualists often contend that special interest groups, congressional staff, or individual legislators try to influence subsequent judicial interpretation of a statute by deliberately manipulating legislative history." °1
In addition, critics of legislative history usually assert that there is no

intent of the legislature because most members of Congress do not have a
specific intent about all the issues in a bill, the intent of members may
change in the give-and-take of legislative compromise, and it is usually
impossible to know the aggregate intent of large groups of people.'
More(Justice White, joined by every member of Supreme Court except Justice Scalia, responding
to Scalia's concurring opinion and briefly defending use of legislative history in "good-faith
effort to discern legislative intent"); Merrill, Textualism, supra note 23, at 363-65 (noting
that majority of Justices on Court have remained willing to consider legislative history);
Slawson, supra note 195, at 383 (same).
198. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2; Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 192
(1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing and relying on INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983));
Mashaw, supra note 195, at 843 (arguing that federalist principles support textualism);
Slawson, supra note 195, at 406, 417; Spence, supra note 26, at 591-92; Zeppos, supranote
26, at 1300-01.
199. Justice Scalia, however, believes that amendments defeated on the floor and
extended floor debates which alter the final text are the most reliable form of legislative
history and, contrary to traditional wisdom, that committee reports are the least reliable.
Farber & Frickey, supra note 13, at 442 n.64 (quoting unpublished address by Judge
Antonin Scalia, Speech on Use of Legislative History (delivered between fall 1985 and
spring 1986 at various law schools in varying forms)).
200. See George A. Costello, Average Voting Members and Other "Benign Fictions":
The Relative Reliability of Committee Reports, FloorDebates, and Other Sources of Legislative History, 1990 DuKE L.J. 39, 41-43; Spence, supra note 26, at 592-93.
201. See Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 97-99 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(charging that committee reports are often drafted by staff members at their own initiative
or at suggestion of lawyer-lobbyist); In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1343 (7th Cir. 1989)
(Easterbrook, J.) ("[L]egislative history is a poor guide to legislators' intent because it is
written by the staff rather than members of Congress ....");
see also ESKRiDGE, supra
note 12, at 220-22 (discussing textualist charge that committee staff or even lobbyists write
biased legislative history); Slawson, supra note 195, at 397 (alleging that agency staff and
members of Congress "manufacture" legislative history); Zeppos, supra note 26, at 1302-03
(discussing charge that committee staff or even lobbyists write biased legislative history).
202. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("[W]hile it is possible to discern the objective 'purpose' of a statute ...or even the formal
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over, textualists point out that courts sometimes rely on the comments of a
single legislator, especially the sponsor of a bill, to determine its meaning,
but that reliance on a single legislator is likely to be misleading.3' Furthermore, the legislative record is often incomplete or misleading about the
intentions of either individuals or groups, especially because legislators or
staff members may consciously try to manipulate legislative history.' 4 Many
textualists are also proponents of "public choice" theory, which emphasizes
the role of economic interest groups in the legislative process, 5 and often
argue that the only reliable evidence of the deals struck by interest groups in
Congress is the actual text of a statute.t °6
Textualists also argue that the use of legislative history can allow judges
to impose their value preferences and political beliefs in contradiction to the
apparent meaning of the statutory text.2 7 Because judges are frequently able

motivation for a statute where that is explicitly set forth, . . .discerning the subjective
motivation of those enacting the statute is, to be honest, almost always an impossible task.");
Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes'Domains,50 U. CHI. L. REv. 533, 548-49 (1983) (arguing
that it is impossible to assess aggregate intent of Congress); Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARv. L. REV. 863, 870-71 (1930) (same); see also Kenneth A. Shepsle,
Congress Is a 'They,' Not an 'It'. Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT'L REV. L. &
ECON. 239, 239-56 (1992) (arguing that existence of cyclical majorities renders legislative
intent altogether irrelevant to statutory interpretation and, therefore, courts should look only
at text and not at legislative history). But see ESKRIDGE, supra note 12, at 212-13 (noting
that since 1930s, Congress has been on notice that courts consider legislative history); James
Landis, A Note on "Statutory Interpretation," 43 HARV. L. REv. 886, 888-92 (1930)
(arguing that judge may ascertain probable intent of Congress from majority's assent to
committee reports and legislative amendments).
203. See, e.g., North Haven Board of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 524-27 (1982)
(relying extensively on remarks by Senator Birch Bayh, the bill's sponsor, to determine
meaning of prohibition against gender discrimination in Title IX); Slawson, supra note 195,
at 397 ("All it takes is one member of Congress declaring on the floor his or her 'understanding' of what some vague portion of the bill is 'intended to mean.'"); Zeppos, supra
note 26, at 1302 (noting that courts sometimes rely on remarks of sponsor to determine
statute's intent). Slawson notes: "Normally, however, two members, one of whom is a
sponsor of the bill, cooperate. The second member asks the sponsor what the bill is
intended to mean, and the sponsor answers." Slawson, supra note 195, at 397.
204. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 12, at 212; Pierce, supra note 37, at 741; Spence, supra
note 26, at 592.
205. See Watson, supra note 12, at 216.
206. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 202, at 540-45 (arguing that courts should only
enforce deals clearly expressed in language of statute). But see Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L. REy. 263, 27475 (1982) (noting that terms of interest group deal in Congress are as likely to be reflected
in committee reports and floor comments as in text of statute).
207. See Scalia, supra note 24, at 1176; Spence, supra note 26, at 13.
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to choose from among conflicting portions of legislative history, they can cite
only those portions that suit their predilections. I 8 Thus, judges may misuse
legislative history to impose an interpretation that is contrary to the intent of
the congressional majority that enacted the legislation.'
2. The Argument for Legislative History
Defenders of the use of legislative history in statutory interpretation
often acknowledge that it can be misused,2" ' but argue that it can be useful
in ascertaining the intent or purpose of Congress in enacting a particular
statute. 211 The textualist argument that legislators and their staff persistently
misuse legislative history is greatly overstated because competition among
conflicting interest groups tends to keep the system honest. 212 Many legislators avow that they do read committee reports, and some claim that they are
21 3
more likely to read the committee report than the text of the statute.

208. See ACLU v. FCC, 823 F.2d 1554, 1583 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Starr, J., dissenting)
("We in the judiciary have become shamelessly profligate and unthinking in our use of
legislative history . . . ."); Pierce, supra note 37, at 751; Wald, supra note 37, at 214
(discussing ability of judges to use selective portions of legislative history).
209. See Pierce, supra note 37, at 741 (arguing that revival of textualism during 1980s
was to some extent healthy development counteracting improper use of legislative history).
210. See, e.g., Mikva, supra note 39, at 384; Pierce, supra note 37, at 751; Spence,
supra note 26, at 599; Wald, supra note 37, at 214 (discussing ability of judges to use
selective portions of legislative history).
211. See American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 899 F.2d 651, 657-58 (7th Cir. 1990)
(Posner, J.).
212. See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 98-99 (1991); James J. Brudney, CongressionalCommentary on
JudicialInterpretationsof Statutes: Idle Chatter or Telling Response?, 93 MICH. L. REv.
1, 51-52 (1994); Spence, supra note 26, at 607. But see Slawson, supra note 195, at 397-98
(arguing that it is difficult for opposing members of Congress to respond to or even learn
about biased legislative history).
213. See Joan Biskupic, Scalia Takes a Narrow View in Seeking Congress' Will, 48
CONG. Q. 913, 917 (1990) (relating Senator Specter's view that he is more likely to read
committee report than text of statute); Brudney, supra note 212, at 28; Farber & Frickey,
supra note 13, at 445 ("[Ajccording to a principal study of congressional policymaking
procedures, legislators outside the committee and their staffs focus primarily upon the
report, not the bill itself."); Abner J. Mikva, Reading and Writing Statutes, 28 S. TEX. L.
REV 181, 184 (1986) (former Congressman and then Judge on the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit commenting on legislators' reading of committee report
rather than statutory text); Slawson, supranote 195, at 404 ("Legislators rarely read the
entire text of a bill on which they vote, and sometimes they do not read any of it, relying
instead on committee reports, staff summaries, and discussions and debates with other
legislators.").
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On the other hand, even if the textualist argument that legislators pay
little attention to committee reports is at least partly correct, that contention
raises questions about whether slothful legislators even read the statutory
texts that textualists consider so important.214 Furthermore, the criticism that
legislative history may be written by an unrepresentative minority applies
equally well to the text itself.=I' Textualists implicitly create a false dichotan objective, reliable, and clear text and manipulable legislative
omy between
216
history.
In addition, Scalia's argument that courts should look at the text because
it alone has been passed by both Houses and presented to the President
erroneously confuses the Article I limits on congressional power to make
laws with the Article III powers employed by courts in applying and interpreting laws.217 Legislative history itself is not "the law," but it can help
judges and agencies interpret a statute's language.2 8 Thus, judges or agencies can and should look at both the text and its legislative history to understand what Congress meant.
Although textualists often argue that judges can use legislative history
to disregard the intent of the congressional majority, ignoring legislative
history is more likely to enhance judicial power at the expense of Congress
because textualists refuse to consider one of the most important ways that
Congress actually communicates its policy views - through legislative
history.2" 9 As long as Congress continues to rely on committee reports and
floor debates to explain legislation to members who do not belong to a
committee that was involved in drafting a bill, courts should treat legislative
history with a degree of respect.'
214. See Zeppos, supra note 26, at 1311-13. But see Slawson, supra note 195, at 40405 (arguing that even if legislators are more likely, on average, to read bill's legislative
history than its actual text, fact that text is always available to members while certain types
of legislative history may not be available means that text has more democratic legitimacy
than legislative history).
215. See Brudney, supra note 212, at 53; Zeppos, supra note 26, at 1311-13.
216. See Zeppos, supra note 26, at 1323.
217. Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S.
CAL. L. REv. 845, 862-63 (1992); Brudney, supra note 212, at 42; Eskridge, supra note 23,
at 671-72.
218. See Brudney, supra note 212, at 42-43.
219. See id. at 40; Spence, supra note 26, at 593-94; Zeppos, supra note 26, at 131314, 1331-32.
220. See Brudney, supra note 212, at 45-46 (arguing that courts should respect
Congress's use of legislative history); Spence, supra note 26, at 593-94, 604-07 (same). But
see Hatch, supra note 195, at 44-45 (expressing concern about role of staff in creating
legislative history relied upon by courts).
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Moreover, despite the difficulties in getting a cumbersome institution
such as Congress to override a judicial decision," t some empirical studies
suggest that Congress is more likely to override textualist judicial interpretations of statutes than ones that consider the relevant legislative history.'
Congressional reversals of statutory decisions appear to have increased
significantly during the 1980s.22 There are a number of possible explanations for the rise in such overrides, including Professor Eskridge's thesis that
such reversals resulted in large part during the 1980s from conflict between
a conservative president and Supreme Court on one hand and an increasingly
liberal Congress on the other. 4 It may be significant, however, that Professors Solimine and Walker found that "a disproportionate number of overridden cases used a 'plain meaning' analysis."I One difficulty in assessing the
finding that Congress is more likely to override the Supreme Court's textualist interpretations of statutes is whether the choice of textualism alone is
significant or whether textualism is often associated with conservative political views that influence how courts decide issues and how a liberal Congress
might respond to a textualist opinion.' m One study found that judges ap221. See Herz, supra note 42, at 204; Spence, supra note 26, at 602-03. But see John
Copeland Nagle, CorrectionsDay, 43 UCLA L. RaV. 1267, 1281-86, 1290-1315, 1319
(1996) (acknowledging that curreht congressional procedures for correcting statutory
mistakes are inadequate, but arguing that "Corrections Day" process can enable Congress
to pass corrective legislation more easily). Between 1967 and 1990, Congress overrode 121
Supreme Court statutory interpretations or more than an average of 5 per year. See William
N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretations, 101 YALE L.J. 331,
344 (1991).
222. See West Va. Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 112-16 (1991) (Stevens,
J., dissenting); Eskridge, supra note 221, app. I at 424-41, app. III at 450-55 (finding
relatively strong evidence that Congress is more likely to override textualist Supreme Court
decisions by amending or enacting new legislation); Michael E. Solimine & James L.
Walker, The Next Word: CongressionalResponse to Supreme Court Statutory Decisions, 65
TEMP. L. REv. 425, 451 (1992) (finding that empirical data on statutory overrulings of
Supreme Court decisions "lends some mild support to the view expressed by Justice Stevens
that textual decisions by the Court are often overturned by Congress").
223. See Eskridge, supra note 221, at 395-96; Solimine & Walker, supranote 222, at
435,451.
224. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History? Playing the Court/Congressi
President Civil Rights Game, 79 CAL. L. REv. 613, 616-17 (1991); Eskridge, supra note
221, at 395-96.
225. See Solimine & Walker, supra note 222, at 448 (finding that whether Supreme
Court employed plain meaning test was statistically significant at .001 level in explaining
congressional overrides of Court's statutory decisions based on random sample of 80 cases).
226. See Eskridge, supra note 221, at 405-06 (equating textualism with formalist and
conservative political theory); Eskridge, supra note 23, at 646-50 (same); Solimine &
Walker, supra note 222, at 448 (arguing that conclusion that Congress is more likely to
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pointed by President Reagan tended to use a plain meaning approach to
impose their own political preferences rather than the preferences of the

then Democratic congressional majority. 7 Regardless of textualism's
political implications, if Congress is more likely to override judicial decisions based on a textualist approach to statutory interpretations, courts
would be wise at least to consider a statute's legislative history.'
Although legislative history is often useful in understanding a statute,
Congress does not intend nonstatutory legislative history to be the equivalent of a statute, and judges should not treat it as such.29 However, courts
can continue to treat certain types of legislative history as being more

authoritative than others, with contemporaneous committee reports usually
seen as the most reliable and subsequent legislative history as the least

reliable.2 0 Even Judge Easterbrook, who strongly supports a textualist
approach and is highly critical of the way many judges use legislative
history,2 has stated that legislative history may be used to explicate the

meaning of a text as long as "it is not a source of legal rules competing
with those found in the U.S. Code."a Judge Easterbrook has also argued
that although a narrow textualist approach to statutory interpretation should
be used when a statute affects only private interest groups, a broader, more

remedial reading of statutes is often appropriate for statutes that primarily
affect the general public.

3

Although some environmental statutes affect

only a particular industry or even one firm, most are concerned with broad,
override Supreme Court statutory interpretations based upon plain meaning approach "gives
little support to the ideology assumptions, unless one is prepared to believe that the Court
is merely using plain language as a subterfuge for imposing either its ideological preference
or the wishes of some interest group" (citation omitted)).
227. See Stephen F. Ross, ReaganistRealism Comes to Detroit, 1989 U. ILL. L. REv.
399, 401-02, 420-33; see also Spence, supra note 26, at 601 n.80.
228. See Spence, supra note 26, at 601.
229. Id. at 598.
230. See American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 899 F.2d 651, 657-58 (7th Cir. 1990);
ESKRI GE, supra note 12, at 222; Eskridge, supra note 23, at 630-40; Spence, supra note
26, at 593 n.35. See generally Costello, supra note 200 (offering examples).
231. See In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1341-44 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J.);
Easterbrook, supra note 202, at 540-46 (proposing "clear statement principle" as general
rule of statutory interpretation); Karkkainen, supra note 28, at 454-55 (comparing and
contrasting Judge Easterbrook's "clear statement principle" with Justice Scalia's less activist,
canon-based approach).
232. Sinclair, 870 F.2d at 1344.
233. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term - Foreword: The
Court and the Economic System, 98 HARv. L. REv. 4, 15-16 (1984); Easterbrook, supra
note 202, at 541-44.
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public questions and, therefore, require a broader approach than Scalia's
narrow textualism.
Finally, Chevron's search for the "intent of Congress"'

is best served

in most cases by considering legislative history. Although Justice Scalia
has contended that a textualist methodology is more likely to find that a
statute is not ambiguous than an approach to statutory interpretation that
allows extensive examination of legislative history, 5 legislative history is
more likely to address a specific issue than the text in most cases.*26
Furthermore, the Court has held that legislative history may trump even
plain statutory language if the statutory language would produce "an odd

result." 7 Despite the ways agency staff or members of Congress can
misuse legislative history, examining both a statute's text and its relevant
legislative history is more likely to indicate the probable intent of Congress about a specific issue than simply scrutinizing the plain meaning of
the text.
234. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842-43 (1984).
235. In a law review article, Justice Scalia argued that he seldom needs to defer to
agency statutory interpretations under Chevron because he usually finds a clear meaning in
the statute's text:
One who finds more often (as I do) that the meaning of a statute is apparent from
its text and from its relationship with other laws, thereby finds less often that the
triggering requirement for Chevron deference exists. It is thus relatively rare
that Chevron will require me to accept an interpretation which, though reasonable, I would not personally adopt.
Scalia, supra note 24, at 521; see also Edward C. Donovan, The Interstate Commerce Commission and the BoundariesofAgency Discretion in Statutory Interpretation,60 GEO. WAsH.
L. REV. 1357, 1379-84 (1992) (arguing that use of legislative history in first step creates
more ambiguity and deference to agency). But see infra note 236 and accompanying text.
236. See Breyer, supra note 77, at 856-61; Farber & Frickey, supra note 13, at 457-58;
Merrill, Deference, supra note 23, at 992 n.101 (disagreeing with Justice Scalia's argument
and arguing that "textualism will answer the 'precise question' at issue in so few cases that
it'leads courts to abandon the quest for specific congressional answers, thus allowing a
dramatically expanded judicial role at step one"); Merrill, Textualism, supranote 23, at 36670 (arguing that use of legislative history does not, contrary to Justice Scalia's argument,
result in greater uncertainty about meaning of statutes); Slawson, supra note 195, at 400
(noting that legislative history is more likely to address specific issue than text); Wald, supra
note 39, at 301-02.
237. Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 454 (1989)
(quoting Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 509 (1989)); Gonzalez, supra
note 26, at 607; Slawson, supra note 195, at 396, 400. But see Public Citizen, 491 U.S.
at 473 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (arguing that courts should follow statutory text unless
interpretation produces "absurd result"); Nagle, supra note 221, at 1288 (asserting that
absurd results doctrine is unclear).
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B. Using Legislative History to Interpret the Clean Water Act

An environmental statute's meaning is sometimes better explained by
its legislative history than its text. For instance, in Train v. Colorado
Public Interest Research Group, Inc., a citizen suit was brought against
the EPA to compel the agency to perform an allegedly nondiscretionary
duty to regulate the discharges of certain radioactive materials into navigable waters under the Clean Water Act. 9 The Atomic Energy Commission
(AEC) and its successors had regulated these materials for many years
under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.2 o "The Court of Appeals resolved
the question exclusively by reference to the language of the statute"24 1 and
easily concluded that the EPA had the authority under the Act to regulate
such materials because "the statute is plain and unambiguous and should be
given its obvious meaning."242 The Tenth Circuit observed that the legislative history was "conflicting and inconclusive," but concluded that it did not
even have to consider the legislative history because "the legislative intent
is clearly manifested in the language of the statute itself, and we need not
resort to legislative history. "243 The Clean Water Act forbids the discharge
of pollutants into navigable waters unless the discharger has a permit issued
either by the EPA or by a state that has a permit program approved by the
EPA. 2' "The term 'pollutant' is defined by the [Act] to include, inter alia,
'radioactive materials,' "245 and neither of the two explicit exceptions to the
definition of "pollutant" in the statutory text applies to radioactive materials.2' From its analysis of the statutory language, the court of appeals
concluded that Congress, by referring to "radioactive materials," meant to
include "all radioactive materials, and we so hold. "247
238. 426 U.S. 1 (1976).
239. Train v. Colorado Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc., 426 U.S. 1, 4 (1976);
Zeppos, supra note 26, at 1364-65.
240. Train, 426 U.S. at 5. See generally Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83703, 68 Stat. 919 (1954) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2297 (1994)).
241. Train, 426 U.S. at 9.
242. Colorado Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Train, 507 F.2d 743, 748 (10th
Cir. 1974), rev'd, 426 U.S. 1 (1976).
243. Id.
244. 33 U.S.C. §§ 13 11(a), 1342 (1994); Train, 426 U.S. at 7.
245. Train, 426 U.S. at 7.
246. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6); see also Train, 426 U.S. at 7-9; Colorado Pub. Interest
Research Group, 507 F.2d at 747-48. The two exceptions apply to "sewage from vessels"
and material injected into an oil or gas well. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6); see also Train, 426 U.S.
at 7 n.7.
247. Colorado Pub. Interest Research Group, 507 F.2d at 747; see also Train, 426 U.S.
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The Supreme Court, however, unanimously reversed the court of
appeals,248 concluding that attention to the relevant legislative history was
proper, that consideration of the legislative history demonstrated that
Congress intended to keep regulation of radioactive material exclusively
within the jurisdiction of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the successor
to the AEC and, therefore, that the EPA had no authority to regulate the
discharge of the source, byproduct, and special nuclear materials covered
by the Atomic Energy Act.249 In Train, a pre-Chevron decision, the Court
"d[id] not depend upon the EPA interpretation of the Act in reaching [its]
conclusion."" 0 The Court stated that it was proper to consider a statute's
legislative history as an "aid to construction of the meaning ofwords, as
used in the statute," even if the text appeared to be "clear" upon "superficial examination."'" The House committee report explicitly exempted
radioactive materials regulated by the AEC and expressly stated that only
radioactive substances not subject to the Commission's jurisdiction were
within the scope of the proposed Clean Water Act. 2 Both the House and
Senate floor debates, especially a colloquy between Senator Pastore, the
Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, and Senator Muskie,
the primary author of the Clean Water Act, emphasized that the proposed
Act did not affect the AEC's exclusive control over the discharge of source,
Furthermore, the House
byproduct, and special nuclear materials.3
rejected an amendment to the Clean Water Act that would have effectively
In light of the
eliminated the AEC's control over these materials.'
statute's legislative history, it was reasonable for the Court to reject the
obvious textualist reading of the Act and to place regulatory authority over
these materials where Congress intended - with the AEC5
In retrospect, Congress's decision to give the AEC and its successors
control over these radioactive materials may have been an unsound policy
choice. Because the EPA regulates many different industries with competat 9.
248. Justice Stevens did not take part in the case. Train, 426 U.S. at 25.

249. See id. at 10-25.
250. Id. at 8 n.8.
251. Id. at 10 (citations omitted).
252. Train, 426 U.S. at 11 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 92-911, at 131 (1972)).
253. Id. at 14. A ranking member of the Conference Committee, Representative

I-arsha, reaffirmed that "[t]he conference report does not change the original intent as it was
made clear in the colloquy between Senators Muskie and Pastore in the course of the debate
in the other body." Id. at 22 (quoting S. CoNF. REP. No. 92-1236, at 226 (1972)).

254. See id. at 17-22.
255. See Zeppos, supra note 26, at 1365.
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ing interests, it is less vulnerable to "capture" or disproportionate influence
by industry than the AEC and its successors, whose very bureaucratic
existence depends on the continuing viability of the nuclear power
industry. 6 Nevertheless, the Train Court's conclusion that the AEC and
its successors retained exclusive control over the discharge of certain
radioactive materials was probably the most accurate reading of Congress's
intent in enacting the Clean Water Act.
On the one hand, Train supports the Lazarus-Newman thesis that the
legislative histories of environmental statutes often contain pro-industry
exceptions not found in the text. On the other hand, Train illustrates how
misleading it can be to try to determine Congress's intent from the text
alone. Although there is an argument for just considering the text because
it is the only material that Congress has formally enacted and presented to
the President, there is a stronger case for considering both the text and the
legislative history as a means to reconstruct Congress's intent. Professor
Lazarus and Ms. Newman might argue that the policy consequences of
adopting a textualist approach that favors environmental advocacy groups
outweigh the importance of using legislative history to ascertain congressional intent. Environmental agencies, however, are better suited to address
the full range of policy issues than a judge trying to deduce the "ordinary
understanding" of a complex environmental statute.
VL Why Textualism Downplays Agency Expertise
A. Chevron and Statutory Interpretation
By refusing to defer to any agency interpretation that diverges from the
plain language of the statutory text, strict textualist judicial review may
comply with the letter of Chevron's two-part test, but undermines Chevron's basic premise that agencies are better equipped than judges to interpret statutes within the agency's policymaking jurisdiction.' Traditionally,
many scholars and judges have believed that courts have a special compe256. See Dwyer, supra note 13, at 236, 309-10 (suggesting that EPA is not captured
agency because many different interest groups monitor its actions); Jonathan R. Macey,
OrganizationalDesign and Political Control of Administrative Agencies, 8 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 93, 93-94 (1992) (observing that agencies that regulate multiple industries are less
vulnerable to agency capture than agencies that regulate single industry); Bradford C. Mank,
Superfund Contractors and Agency Capture, 2 N.Y.U. ENv'rL. L.J. 34, 49-52 (1993)
(arguing that EPA is less vulnerable to agency capture because it regulates multiple industries).
257. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 865-66 (1984); Herz, supra note 42, at 199.
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tence in interpreting statutes and should supervise agency statutory interpretations to make sure they are consistent with congressional intent. 258 Both
Chevron and some recent scholarship have suggested, however, that agencies may be more adept at discerning statutory meaning because they have
a closer relationship to the political branches. 9 Furthermore, if Congress
has delegated significant policymaking powers to an agency, then courts
should generally defer to the agency's interpretation of statutes falling
within the scope of that policymaking function.'
On the other hand, if a
question is outside the agency's policymaking domain, a court should give
the agency's interpretation no more weight than that of any other litigant,
and the court should exercise the lawfinding function to determine what the
statute says.-6 Of course, drawing the line between these two functions
raises many questions.' 6 In addition, courts must still examine whether
decisions within an agency's policymaking function are reasonable or
consistent with the underlying statute's purposes.'
Nevertheless, courts
should "consciously restrict their independent judgments to the 'cognitive'
core of interpretation where constitutional notions of legislative supremacy
and conventional notions of institutional competence conspire most strongly
against administrative hegemony."I4
Chevron suggested that agencies have a comparative advantage over
courts in policymaking because agencies possess greater technical expertise
than judges.'
Some commentators, however, have questioned whether
agency bureaucrats and scientists actually possess useful technical knowledge that would enable them to make better and more informed decisions

258. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
259. See Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretationin the AdministrativeState, 133 U. PA.

L. REV. 549, 574-76 (1985); supra text accompanying notes 59-61.
260.

See Diver, supranote 259, at 593.

261. See id.
262. See id.at 593-98 (discussing difficulties in drawing line between policymaking and
lawfinding). But see GLEN 0. ROBINSON, AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY: PUBLIC CHOICE AND
PUBLIC LAw 179-81 (1991) (discussing Diver's criteria for determining degree of judicial
deference to agency decisions and arguing that "[i]n the end, Diver's criteria, though useful
to some degree, turn out to be so ambiguous in application that they fail to provide us with
much more than the vaguest of guidelines").
263. See Diver, supra note 259, at 597.
264. See id. at 598.
265. See Herz, supra note 42, at 199; see also Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984). See generally NEIL K.
KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND

PUBLIC POLICY (1994) (discussing concept of comparative institutional competence).
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than members of the general public.'
The EPA and other agencies have
often overstated the ability of science to resolve issues like the acceptable

risk from nonthreshold carcinogens that pose some risk in even minute
amounts.'

Ultimately, decisions about the distribution and amount of

societal risk in society are political in nature."S
Nevertheless, experienced EPA engineers, scientists, and managers

possess a "techno-bureaucratic" expertise based on practical experience with
a large number of highly complex regulatory issues involving scientific,
engineering, and policy components that allows them to understand the

interplay between technical issues and congressional statutes better than the
general public or most judges. 69 Textualism is based on the flawed premise that courts can use dictionary definitions and the understanding of
ordinary users of the English language to interpret complex regulatory
statutes. Most noncriminal federal statutes, however, are directed "at a
266. See Clayton P. Gillette & James E. Krier, Risk, Courts, and Agencies, 138 U. PA.
L. REV. 1027, 1061-85 (1990) (questioning whether expert quantitative risk assessment
produces better evaluation of risk than public's concern with various qualitative factors);
Donald T. Hornstein, Reclaiming EnvironmentalLaw: A Normative Critique of Comparative
Risk Analysis, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 562, 562-65, 610-11 (1992) (same).
267. See Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charadein Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM.
L. REv. 1613, 1631-40 (1995).
268. See Lisa Heinzerling, PoliticalScience, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 449, 472-73 (1995)
(reviewing STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE (1993) and noting need to
harmonize citizen involvement in regulation with expertise of scientific community).
269. Professor McGarity has sought to explain how most EPA engineers, scientists, and
managers make decisions by coining the concept of "techno-bureaucratic rationality":
Techno-bureaucratic rationality is a rationality built on a unique understanding
of the regulatory universe that is born out of frustrating hands-on experience with
unanswerable questions of extraordinary complexity. It is, in a sense, a "second
best" rationality that recognizes the limitations that inadequate data, unquantifiable values, mixed societal goals, and political realities place on the capacity of
structured rational thinking, and it does the best that it can with what it has.
THOMAS 0. McGARIrY, REINVENTING RATIONALrrY: THE ROLE OF REGULATORY ANALYSIS
5-6 (1991); see also BREYTER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE 61-62 (discussing advantages
of bureaucratic rationalization and substantive expertise). There is evidence, however, that
experts are little better than laypersons at making predictions, and that statistical formulas
are better predictors of, for instance, medical school performance than individualized
judgments of admissions experts. See Farber, supra note 17, at 557 n.113. Because of time
and information limitations, there is a tendency on the part of agency staff and managers to
use familiar regulatory approaches rather than innovative ones. See McGARITY, supra, at
14-16 (noting that regulatory decisionmaking is subject to time and information limitations).
In recent years, however, the EPA has experimented with a hybrid model of decisionmaking
that emphasizes interdisciplinary teams and the early involvement of senior administrators
to insure that a wide range of policies are in fact considered. See id. at 239-62.
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small community of lawyers, regulators, and people subject to their specific
regulations" and, therefore, courts should defer to this small community's
understanding of the statute rather than what might be the plain meaning to

ordinary users of the English language.'
Chevron also stated that agencies are more democratically accountable
than judges because executive agencies are subject to the ultimate control

of the President," 7 through the appointment and removal power,'
are subject to the congressional oversight and budget process.'

7

and also
Although

"regulatory agencies are not as representative as the legislature," 274 noticeand-comment rulemaking in the Federal Register frequently furnishes
agencies with a far broader perspective on political interests than the
litigation process and often provides their decisions with a semimajoritarian
270. Ross, supra note 40, at 1057-62, 1067; see also Farber, supra note 17, at 552-53
(stating that most statutes are addressed to specialized audiences); Edward L. Rubin, Modern
Statutes, Loose Canons, and the Limits of PracticalReason:A Response to Farberand Ross,
45 VAND. L. REv. 579, 580-87 (1992) (same); Slawson, supra note 195, at 420 (same). A
small interpretive community may be able to agree on the meaning of a statutory text when
ordinary users of the language would find a variety of possible meanings or would find that
the text makes no sense at all. See Ross, supra note 40, at 1057-58, 1067; Rubin, supra,
at 579-80, 585-87, 591; see also POSNER, supra note 14, at 436-39, 450-51 (discussing and
criticizing idea of interpretive community of lawyers). See generally Owen M. Fiss,
Conventionalism, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 177 (1985) (arguing texts have objective meanings as
defined by interpretive community of lawyers and judges). Professor Stanley Fish has used
the term "interpretive community" in the sense of a like-thinking group imposing an
arbitrary meaning on an indeterminate text and, therefore, has at least implicitly raised
questions about the legitimacy of such communities. See POSNER, supra note 14, at 450
(discussing Fish's approach). See generally STANLEY FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN TIS
CLASS? THE AUTHORITY OF INTERPRETrvE CoMMuNrrIEs (1980).

271. See Dwyer, supra note 13, at 284 (recognizing that agencies have more legitimate
political basis than do courts).
272. See Peter L. Strauss, The Place ofAgencies in Government: Separation of Powers
and the FourthBranch, 84 CoLuM. L. REv. 573, 590 (1984) (arguing that President enjoys
control over only limited layer of top staff in executive agencies and that political factors
often make it difficult to exercise control over even top staff who have political constituency).
273. See Richard 3. Lazarus, The Neglected Question of CongressionalOversight of
EPA: Quis CustodietIpsos Custodes (Who Shall Watch the Watchers Themselves)?, 54 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1991, at 206 (stating that "Congress appears to engage in
more intense and pervasive oversight of EPA than it does of other agencies"); Nagle, supra
note 221, at 1285-86 ("Members of Congress make their views known to agency officials
at oversight hearings, through letters to an agency, and by staff contacts with agency
employees .... [These methods frequently prove the most successful in convincing a
reluctant but intimidated agency to comply with congressional wishes (or at least the wishes
of some members of Congress).").
274. Dwyer, supra note 13, at 284.
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level of political legitimacy.275 In addition, Congress can easily expand the
ability of the public to participate in agency decisionmaking beyond the
notice-and-comment procedures in Section 553 of the Administrative
Procedure Act 76 by requiring agencies to hold public hearings; adopting
hybrid rulemaking procedures, such as giving the public the right to cross-

examine agency or industry expert witnesses; requiring agencies to survey
public opinion; providing citizens with technical assistance grants to research issues; encouraging regulatory negotiation prior to the issuance of
rules; or even paying citizens to participate? 77 By contrast, courts sometimes get a sense of the political realities of an issue from the litigants or

amicus briefs, but it is normally inappropriate for a judge to discuss pending litigation with legislators, members of the White House staff, or influential lobbyists in the same manner as the Administrator of the EPA 7 In
a few instances, it may be necessary for courts to reverse an agency policy
that appears to be biased in favor of a special interest group and against the
public interest, as defined by the applicable statute, but the involvement of
public interest groups, competition among competing industries, and the

professional training of agency staff make agencies less vulnerable to
"capture" than commentators have occasionally suggested.2

9

275. See id. (suggesting that agencies often possess "semimajoritarian cast"); Jerry L.
Mashaw & David L. Harfst, Regulation and Legal Culture: The Case of Motor Vehicle
Safety, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 257, 272 (1987) (noting that feedback from numerous sources
can make agencies acutely aware of public opinion and political currents surrounding regulatory issues).
276. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1994).
277. See Bradford C. Mank, What Comes After Technology: Using an "Exception Process" to Improve Residual Risk Regulation of HazardousAir Pollutants, 13 STAN. ENVTL.
L.J. 263, 338-43 (1994) (discussing several ways to increase public participation in administrative decisionmaking including mandating formal or informal public hearings and providing
technical assistance grants to allow citizens to research complex issues); see also Richard
H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHi. L. REv. 1, 7286 (1995) (discussing use of quantitative survey techniques for gauging public opinion about
issues). See generally Ellen Siegler, Regulatory Negotiations:A PracticalPerspective, 22
ENVTL. L. REP. (News & Analysis) 10647 (1992) (discussing regulatory negotiation); Carl
Tobias, GreatExpectations and Mismatched Compensation: Government Sponsored Public
Participationin Proceedings of the Consumer Product Safety Commission, 64 WASH. U.
L.Q. 1101 (1986) (discussing how agency experimented with reimbursing nonregulated
individuals andorganizations for costs of their involvement in administrative proceedings).
278. See ESKRIGE, supra note 12, at 124 (stating that judges are not supposed to talk
with enacting legislators); see also Dwyer, supra note 13, at 284, 288 (observing that
agencies are in regular communication with congressional committees, White House, and
various interest groups); Mashaw & Harfst, supra note 275, at 272 (same).
279. See Dwyer, supra note 13, at 236, 309-10 (noting that EPA is not captured agency

TEXTUALISM AND ENVIRONMENTALISM

1283

Because agencies, unlike courts, are often in'¢olved in the drafting of
statutes and the creation of legislative history, agencies are better suited
than courts, which are third parties to the legislative process, to know when

the use of legislative history is truly appropriate in reading the statutory
text.' 0 Agencies are also more likely than courts to know whether a particular portion of legislative history is relevant because agency administrators make regular appearances before Congress." t Moreover, as Chevron
stated, Congress often explicitly or implicitly delegates policymaking
authority to an agency.' If Congress has delegated such authority, it is
fair for the agency to consider a statute's legislative history when interpret-

ing a statute because an agency has more freedom than a court to consider
factors beyond the statutory text, even including the political views of the

incumbent administration.'a Although it may be proper for courts to treat
postenactment legislative statements and actions with caution so as to adhere

to the original intent of the enacting legislature,' it is more appropriate for
agencies to consider such materials because Congress expects them to
consult regularly with congressional oversight committees and because the
current Congress always has control over the necessary budget resources.5
because many different interest groups monitor its actions); Lazarus, supra note 98, at 36466 (arguing that interest group competition and values of typical EPA employee make
capture of EPA unlikely); Mank, supra note 256, at 51 (same); Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic
Republican Justificationfor BureaucraticDecisionmaking, 105 HARv. L. REv. 1511, 155455 (1992) (suggesting that professional training of agency staff decreases possibility of
agency capture).
280. See Dwyer, supra note 13,-at 283 (observing that agencies are often involved in
drafting and amending statutes); Herz, supra note 42, at 199 (commenting that agencies are
often involved in drafting statutes and creating legislative history). But see Slawson, supra
note 195, at 401-02, 406-07 (arguing that agencies often use legislative history to justify
decisions that have little basis in powers delegated by Congress in text).
281. See generally Lazarus, supra note 273, at 205-39 (discussing congressional
oversight of EPA).
282. See supranotes 51-52 and accompanying text.
283. See supratext accompanying note 53; supra note 61 and accompanying text.
284. Intentionalists generally believe that postenactment legislative statements and
actions are the least reliable form of legislative history because the goal of the interpreter
is to find the intent of the original enacting legislature rather than to survey current legislative preferences. See Brudney, supra note 212, at 61-66 (discussing when it is appropriate
for court to consider postenactment legislative history); Dwyer, supra note 13, at 301;
Farber & Frickey, supra note 13, at 466-68 (noting arguments against use of subsequent
legislative history); Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation- in the Classroomand in
the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 800, 809-10 (1983) (evaluating drawbacks of
postenactment legislative materials).
285. See Dwyer, supra note 13, at 301-02; see also Hazardous Waste Treatment
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Postenactment legislative information is especially helpful when an agency
must implement aspirational or symbolic statutory language that has no
definite original meaning.'

Agencies are better equipped to address the practical realities of
regulatory policy than are courts, which often focus on abstruse princi-

ples. 2 7 The ability of regulatory agencies to reformulate policies and
interpretations as political administrations change is often a tremendous
advantage in achieving an interpretation that can maintain majoritarian
political support. 8 Although the administrative costs of variance procedures can be high and there is the danger of political bias, environmental

agencies can often achieve better individual justice by granting an exemption to a firm, if a general regulation imposes unreasonable costs on it in
relationship to the social benefits gained. 9 The relative isolation of federal
judges makes them better suited for the role of a check against agency
behavior that exceeds the bounds of the agency's delegated authority than
for the role of interpreter of the first resort. 29° Because courts are not
institutionally suited to make regulatory policy choices, the judiciary should
generally defer to agency interpretations that are within the scope of the
agency's jurisdiction and allow the Congress or the President to use pol-

itical or budgetary power to change policies that appear to be ill-advised.29' ,

Council v. EPA, 886 F.2d 355, 365 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (declaring that EPA should consider
post-enactment legislative comments on same basis as any other comment, but cannot treat
them as part of statute's legislative history).
286. See Dwyer, supranote 13, at 301-02.
287. See Diver, supranote 259, at 574-78, 583-85; Dwyer, supra note 13, at 311.
288. See Diver, supra note 259, at 579-80; Dwyer, supra note 13, at 311-12; Jerry L.
Mashaw, Prodelegation:Why Administrators Should Make PoliticalDecisions, 1 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 81, 95-99 (1985).
289. See Mank, supra note 277, at 313-26 (discussing advantages and disadvantages of
variance procedures in environmental decisionmaking).
290. See MARTIN SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS? JUDICIAL CONTROL OF
ADMINIsTRATION 171 (1988) (arguing for deferential judicial review unless agency exceeds
bounds of its congressionally delegated authority); Dwyer, supra note 13, at 312-13 (same).
291. See Michael Herz, Imposing Unified Executive Branch Statutory Interpretation, 15
CARDOzO L. REV.219, 271 (1993) ("The President has the constitutional authority to insist
on his own reading of Congress's statutes rather than the agency's."); Seidenfeld, supra note
279, at 1551-52 (discussing power of Congress to use budget process to control agencies);
Seidenfeld, supra note 45, at 117-18 n.184, 136 (discussing power of Congress to use
budget or confirmation process to control agencies). But see ESKRIDGE, supra note 12, at
164-71 (arguing that judicial review is needed to prevent President or agency from interpreting statute in way that majority of Congress would reject).
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B. An Agency Theory of Statutory Interpretation
Agencies are not the same as judges. Under Chevron, agencies may
make policy choices or fill in statutory gaps if Congress has implicitly or
explicitly delegated authority to the agency and the statute is ambiguous. 2'
Accordingly, even if one believes the judiciary should adopt a textualist
approach to statutory interpretation, courts should not expect agencies to
employ that methodology within the range of the agency's policymaking
discretion.293
Judge Posner has proposed a theory of "imaginative reconstruction"
that calls on judges to interstitially fill in statutory gaps by "imagin[ing] as
best [one] can how the legislators who enacted the statute would have
wanted it applied to situations they did not foresee. 2 94 Subsequently, Judge
Posner has argued that judges interpreting statutes are like platoon commanders in battle who are sometimes unable to communicate with superior
officers, but must face unanticipated circumstances that their orders did not
contemplate:295 "[R]esponsible platoon commander[s] will ask [themselves]
what [their] captain[s] would have wanted [them] to do if communications
should fail, and similarly judges should ask themselves, when the message
imparted by a statute is unclear, what the legislature would have wanted
them to do in such a case of failed communication." 96 Judge Posner
recognizes that some versions of imaginative reconstruction would allow
judges to impose their views of what constitutes the "public good" when
there is a statutory gap, but also argues that "judges must make a good-faith
effort to effectuate legislation regardless of their agreement or disagreement
with its means or ends. "297
Professors Farber and Frickey have criticized Judge Posner's approach
to statutory interpretation because they believe that judges should not
292. See supra notes 51-52, 62, and accompanying text.

293. See Herz, supra note 42, at 199. But see EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499
U.S. 244, 260 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[D]eference is not abdication, and it requires

us to accept only those agency interpretations that are reasonable in light of the principles
of construction courts normally employ.").
294. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRisis AND REFORM 287 (1985);
Gonzalez, supra note 26, at 607-11 (discussing Judge Posner's theory of imaginative

reconstruction of statutory intent).
295. POSNER, supranote 14, at 270; see Farber & Frickey, supra note 13, at 461-65

(discussing Posner's platoon commander model of statutory interpretation).
296. POSNER, supra note 14, at 270; see Farber & Frickey, supra note 13, at 461-65.
297. See POSNER, supranote 14, at 272-74; see also HART & SACKS, supra note 14,
at 1378 (arguing that judges interpreting statute may assume it was written by "reasonable
[legislators] pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably").
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always choose the statutory interpretation that most probably represents
Congress's intent in enacting the statute, although judges always should
follow a clear directive from the legislature.29 Even if interpretation A is
slightly more likely to represent the legislature's probable intent than
interpretation B, Farber and Frickey would have a judge select B if the
policy results of adopting B are significantly better than selecting A. 2'
They suggest that judges or agencies need to use a "situation sense" or
"practical reason" based on their experience and expertise to enable them
to choose the best interpretation among several competing, plausible choices
in light of both Congress's most probable intent and the policy consequences of various plausible interpretations." °
Professor Eskridge's theory of "dynamic statutory interpretation"
would allow judges to go beyond Congress's probable intent to re-interpret
a statute in light of changed circumstances. Eskridge argues that Posner's
platoon commander analogy understates the problem facing judges in
interpreting statutes because judges, unlike platoon commanders and their
superior officers, are not normally allowed to communicate with Congress,
and many statutory orders are decades old, unlike frequently updated
military orders and, therefore, even more susceptible to unanticipated
circumstances. 0 1 Eskridge contends that judges should act as "relational
agent[s]" whose "primary obligation[s] [are] to use [their] best efforts to
carry out the general goals and specific orders over time.""
Although
courts have sometimes implicitly employed dynamic methods of statutory
construction when changed circumstances made it impractical or impossible
to effectuate the original intent of a statute, 3 3 no court has openly adopted
this method of statutory interpretation and Congress has never approved of
this approach.3 °

298. See Farber & Frickey, supra note 13, at 461-65.
299. Id. at 462-63.

300. See id. at 461-65 (proposing that judges should exercise "practical reason" in
considering both Congress's most probable intent and policy consequences of various
plausible interpretations); see also LLEWELLYN, supra note 176, at 121-54 (proposing judges
rely upon "situation sense" about circumstances of life in deciding difficult legal issues);
Farber, supra note 17, at 533-59 (criticizing formalist approaches to statutory interpretation,
including textualism, and arguing in favor of practical reason or Llewellyn's situation sense

that examines problem of statutory interpretation in light of statutory context or purpose).
301.
302.

See ESKRIDGE, supra note 12, at 124-25.
See id. at 125.

303. See id. at 48-80 & passim (proposing dynamic theory of statutory interpretation
and arguing that courts in many cases implicitly apply such approach).
304. See McNiven, supra note 33, at 1300-01 (asserting that judicial correction of

TEXTUALISM AND ENVIRONMENTALISM

1287

Most textualists would disagree with Posner's, Farber's and Frickey's,
and Eskridge's theories of statutory interpretation on the grounds that
judges or agencies ought to follow the objective statutory intent embodied
in the language of the statute.3es Adherence to the statutory text must be the
norm in a democratic society, and therefore, if a text mandates an unpopular result, it is up to Congress, rather than unelected judges or bureaucrats,
to make a new policy choice." 6 As a practical matter, it is difficult for
either courts or agencies to formulate a test to determine when circumstances have changed sufficiently or when a statute's goals are too financially impractical to enforce. 07 Once a court or agency is cut loose from
the text of a statute, it may be difficult for it to decide how to reformulate
congressional policy. 0 8
If Congress has delegated policymaking discretion to an agency and a
statute is ambiguous, Chevron implies that agencies can follow Farber's and
Frickey's approach by selecting a less probable interpretation of a statute
if that interpretation best serves current policy interests.0 9 Posner's search
for the legislature's probable intent might be an appropriate model for a
judge, but it is too confining for an agency that must be concerned with
policy results and the views of the current Congress. Congress often
expects an agency to go beyond a statute's original intent to make its own
judgments about unanticipated circumstances as long as the agency periodically consults with Congress. 30" An environmental agency is most likely to
be effective if it uses its techno-bureaucratic practical reasoning powers to
balance a reading of Congress's probable intent in enacting a statute with
statutory errors is "more modest" than that proposed by advocates of dynamic statutory
interpretation); Nagle, supra note 221, at 1287-88 (same).
305. See Anthony D'Amato, The Injustice of Dynamic Statutory Interpretation,64 U.
CIN. L. REv. 911, 926-27, 929-32 (1996) (using textualist approach to criticize Posner's and
Eskridge's theories of statutory interpretation).
306. See Dwyer, supra note 13, at 285.

307. See id.
308. See id.
309. See Nagle, supra note 221, at 1289-90 ("Chevron does not say that an agency must
interpret a statute in the manner most faithful to the enacting Congress; an agency need only

show that its preferred interpretation is not contrary to the original legislative intent.").
310. See Dwyer, supra note 13, at 283 (arguing that EPA and Congress often engage
in dialogue about how to reformulate environmental statutes); McNiven, supra note 33, at
1298-99 (discussing role of dialogue between agencies and Congress); Daniel B. Rodriguez,
The Substance of the New Legal Process,77 CAL. L. REv. 919, 928 (1989) ("In the modem
administrative state, the process of law creation, implementation, and interpretation is a
synergistic process involving an ongoing dialogue among all branches of government,
including the headless fourth branch - the adminiLtrative agencies.").
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an examination of the technical, political, and policy issues surrounding different plausible interpretations of the statute." The relational agent theory
makes most sense if an agency is interpreting an old statute and does not
regularly meet with congressional oversight committees, but environmental
agencies such as the EPA are in regular contact with both Congress and the
White House."' The textualist objection that judges should seek an objective interpretation of a statute is less persuasive when applied to agencies
to which Congress has implicitly or explicitly delegated policymaking authority. Some commentators have argued that it is improper for Congress
to delegate substantial legislative authority to agencies," 3 but since 1937 the
Supreme Court has consistently rejected such nondelegation challenges. 1 4
Congress could eliminate many of the disagreements between textualists and proponents of "dynamic" or "modified intentionalist" approaches
to statutory interpretation if the legislature made it clear when an agency
has discretion to deviate from a statutory command that is impossible or
impractical to implement as written. For instance, Congress can make it
easier for agencies and courts to address the problem of unrealistic goals or
deadlines by including explicit severability clauses which would allow the
EPA to ignore a deadline that proves impracticable to achieve as long as the
agency is reducing air pollution in a nonattainment area as "expeditiously
as possible."315 By expressly providing for the possibility that an agency
may have to address changed circumstances, Congress can provide legitimacy for an agency's actions as a relational agent that may satisfy even
strict textualists.
The danger of a textualist approach is that courts will prevent agencies
from making needed adjustments. There has been a tendency in recent
years for Congress to write highly specific legislation, especially environmental statutes. 6 For instance, the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act
311. See McGARrrY, supra note 269, at 5-6 & passim (proposing and discussing concept of techno-bureaucratic expertise); supra note 269 and accompanying text.
312. See Dwyer, supra note 13, at 284, 288 (noting that agencies are in regular

communication with congressional committees, White House, and various interest groups);
Mashaw & Harfst, supra note 275, at 272 (same).
313. See generally DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: How
CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION (1993) (arguing that Congress and
President, rather than agencies, should make law).
314. See Richard B. Stewart, Beyond DelegationDoctrine, 36,AM. U. L. REv. 323, 326
n.20 (1987) ("The year 1937 signalled the end of the brief Schechter era during which the
Court invoked the delegation doctrine to invalidate broad delegations of power.").
315. See McNiven, supra note 33, at 1308.
316. See Herz, supra note 42, at 175-82.
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contain many highly detailed and specific provisions. 17 Some environmen-

tal statutes are so specific that an agency must implement the statute's terms
as embodied in the text, but in other instances an agency may re-interpret
a statutory phrase so that it makes more sense and still fulfills Congress's
general purpose in enacting the legislation. 18
Although Professor Lazarus and Ms. Newman apparently believe

that a textualist approach is useful in part because it prevents the EPA
from making too many exceptions in favor of industry,319 such victories
may be pyrrhic if the EPA must take a rigid approach to environmental
problems that results in the agency ignoring obvious political problems with
a statute and, ultimately, in Congress repealing or weakening the provision."2 As Part V.A discussed, there is some empirical evidence suggesting Congress is more likely to override textualist judicial statutory
interpretations.321 Indeed, representatives of local governments and the

combustion industry quickly proposed compromise legislation to overturn
the City of Chicago decision, although those efforts did not bear immediate
results. 3'2
To fulfill Chevron's essence, courts "should give considerable weight

to an environmental agency's expertise in interpreting complex environmental statutes unless the agency is ignoring Congress's intent or purpose in
317. See id. at 180-82.
318. See id. at 194-203 (arguing that EPA should re-interpret term "average vehicle
occupancy" in Clean Air Act Section 182(d)(1)(B) to instead mean "average ridership"
because former interpretation "fails to give credit for some conduct that furthers the statutory goal, i.e., switching to nonautomotive modes of transportation, but gives credit for
some conduct that conflicts with statutory goals, i.e., switching from nonautomotive modes
to high-occupancy carpools with a resulting increase in the number of cars").
319. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
320. For example, Congress has already allowed states to ignore Clean Air Act Section
182(d)(1)(B), which required large employers in severe and extreme ozone nonattainment
areas to limit vehicle use by their employees, as long as the same emission reductions are
achieved in some other manner. See Clean Air Act: Optional Mandated Trip Reduction,
Pub. L. No. 104-70, 109 Stat. 773 (1995) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 7511a(d)(1)(B) (West
Supp. 1996)); Nagle, supra note 221, at 1301-02. Even EPA's willingness not to enforce
sanctions against states that failed to enforce Section 182(d)(1)(B)'s trip-reducion provisions
was not enough to save the provision from repeal. See H.R. REP. No. 104-387, at 3 (1995)
(noting that six states during 1995 attempted to avoid implementing carpooling program);
Air Pollution:States Must Enforce Trip-Reduction Plans, But EPA Says It Will Not Impose
Sanctions [CurrentDevelopments], 25 Env't Rep. (BNA), at 1862 (Feb. 3, 1995) (reporting
announcement of policy giving assurance that EPA would not sanction states failing to
enforce carpooling programs).
321. See supra notes 222-26 and accompanying text.
322. See Lazarus & Newman, supra note 2, at 26-27.
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enacting the legislation. 3 While textualist statutory interpretation can be
squared with the letter of the Chevron decision, textualists too often fail to
recognize the spirit of Chevron, which emphasized that agencies are usually
more competent at interpreting complex regulatory statutes than are generalist Article III judges. 324 Agencies possess greater technical expertise, are
closer to the political branches, and are more familiar with the practical
problems of implementation than are courts. 325 Because statutory language
in complex regulatory statutes is often directed at a small interpretive
community rather than the public at large, a textualist interpretation is less
likely than an agency's interpretation to embody the probable intent of
Congress or to reach the best policy result.
VII. Conclusion
It may be true, as Professor Lazarus and Ms. Newman argue, that a
textualist approach on average will result in more victories for environmentalists. Nonetheless, Part IV provides a number of counterexamples. More
importantly, textualism is an unsatisfactory method for reconciling aspirational goals in environmental statutes with other provisions that promote
flexibility or cost-saving for industry. Even worse, textualists often disregard the careful balancing of such diverse purposes by environmental
agencies or go out of their way to narrow the authority of agencies.
Professor Lazarus and Ms. Newman may be right that the legislative
histories of environmental statutes contain more pro-industry exemptions
than their texts and, therefore, that environmental advocacy groups are
more likely to win if judges do not consider such material. There are
.serious theoretical objections, however, that they do not address. To best
determine Congress's intent, courts and agencies ought to be able to examine a statute's legislative history.
Finally, textualists often fail to honor the spirit of Chevron even if they
follow its explicit dictates. A textualist approach to interpreting complex
regulatory statutes makes little sense because Congress has written the
legislation for a particular agency to interpret in light of its experience and
expertise. One should not expect that ordinary users of the English language, including judges, will understand the text, legislative history, or
practical problems of a complex regulatory statute as well as the administra323. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 12, at 171 (arguing that even after Chevron, courts
should reject agency statutory interpretations that are based on "political whim" or inadequate factual record).
324. See supra notes 53-54, 257, 265, and accompanying text.
325. See supra notes 269-78, 287-89, and accompanying text.
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tive agency in charge of the statute's implementation. As a result, agencies
are usually better equipped than courts to address the inevitable gaps and
ambiguities in complex regulatory statutes. Courts should not apply a
textualist approach to regulatory statutes that implicitly or explicitly grant
considerable discretion to an agency and rely on the agency's expertise to
fill in gaps in the statutory scheme. Instead, judges should allow environmental agencies to balance both probable congressional intent and policy
considerations in interpreting a statute unless the interpretation frustrates
Congress's intent or purpose in enacting the legislation. Although courts
should prevent agencies from exceeding their delegated authority, the
judiciary should recognize that agencies are often comparatively better
suited to understand the political, technical, and policy ramifications of
different plausible interpretations of a statute.
The Sweet Home decision may indicate that the Supreme Court will not
apply a narrow textualist approach in future environmental cases or may
merely illustrate how divided the Court is over its approach to legislative
history and to statutory interpretation. In his Sweet Home dissent, Justice
Scalia quite correctly pointed out that Justice Stevens's majority opinion
was inconsistent with the textualist approach in City of Chicago.326 The
City of Chicago and Sweet Home decisions sent mixed signals to the lower
courts and left open the possibility that many judges will continue to apply
a flawed textualist approach to statutory interpretation. President Clinton's
appointment of Justice Breyer may tilt the Court against a narrow textualism and iti favor of greater deference to administrative agencies, but the
issue may not be resolved unless and until there are further appointments
to the Court in President Clinton's second term.
In the conclusion of their article, Professor Lazarus and Ms. Newman
acknowledge that textualist judicial decisions often must be followed by
legislative and regulatory actions to address practical implementation
problems left unanswered by the Court.327 They believe, however, that
strict textualist decisions can force agencies and Congress to confront
difficult problems that they have avoided in the past.3
Although textualist decisions can generate positive political fallout,
there is the potential danger that literalist judicial interpretations of aspira326. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 115 S. Ct.
2407, 2426-27 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense
Fund, 114 S. Ct. 1588, 1593 (1994)).
327. See Lazarus & Newman, supra note 2, at 28-29.
328. See id. (noting that City of Chicago forced EPA to address preyiously avoided

issues).
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tional language will lead to radical legislative reform weakening existing

environmental laws, especially if the current Congress is hostile to environ-

mental values.329 Instead of trying to convince courts to use textualist
statutory interpretation as a sledgehammer to force legislative or regulatory
change, environmentalists should work within the political process to
achieve incremental change. In light of the environmental movement's long

success in winning public support and the relative efficacy of environmental
advocacy groups,330 environmentalists should trust agencies in most cases
to reach fair decisions without always binding agencies to the deceptively
clear aspirational language in environmental statutes.

329. In 1995, many environmental groups charged that the newly elected Republican
Congress intended to gut existing environmental laws. See NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE
COUNCIL, BREACH OF FAITH: HOW THE CONTRACT'S FINE PRINT UNDERMINES AMERICA'S
ENVIRONMENTAL SUCCESS 4-17 (1995) (arguing H.R. 9, 104th Cong. (1995) would seriously weaken several important environmental laws).
330. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text. For example, public support for
environmentalism forced the Republican-dominated 104th Congress to abandon most of its
efforts to weaken environmental laws and lead Republicans in 1996 to support bipartisan
legislation to better protect drinking water, fisheries, and food safety. See S. 39, 104th
Cong. (1996) (fisheries legislation); S. 1316, 104th Cong. (1996) (safe drinking water
legislation); H.R. 1627, 104th Cong. (1996) (regulation of pesticides and food safety); Allan
Freedman, Accomplishments, MisstepsMark Congress' Record, 54 CONG. Q. 2918, 2918-19
(1996).

